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ABSTRACT
Many existing encrypted Internet protocols leak information through packet sizes and
timing. Though seemingly innocuous, prior work has shown that such leakage can
be used to recover part or all of the plaintext being encrypted. The prevalence of en-
crypted protocols as the underpinning of such critical services as e-commerce, remote
login, and anonymity networks and the increasing feasibility of attacks on these ser-
vices represent a considerable risk to communications security. Existing mechanisms
for preventing traffic analysis focus on re-routing and padding. These prevention tech-
niques have considerable resource and overhead requirements. Furthermore, padding
is easily detectable and, in some cases, can introduce its own vulnerabilities.
To address these shortcomings, we propose embedding real traffic in synthetically
generated encrypted cover traffic. Novel to our approach is our use of realistic network
protocol behavior models to generate cover traffic. The observable traffic we generate
also has the benefit of being indistinguishable from other real encrypted traffic further
thwarting an adversary’s ability to target attacks. In this dissertation, we introduce the
design of a proxy system called TrafficMimic that implements realistic cover traffic
tunneling and can be used alone or integrated with the Tor anonymity system. We
describe the cover traffic generation process including the subtleties of implementing
a secure traffic generator. We show that TrafficMimic cover traffic can fool a complex
protocol classification attack with 91% of the accuracy of real traffic. TrafficMimic
cover traffic is also not detected by a binary classification attack specifically designed
to detect TrafficMimic.
We evaluate the performance of tunneling with independent cover traffic models and
find that they are comparable, and, in some cases, more efficient than generic constant-
ii
rate defenses. We then use simulation and analytic modeling to understand the perfor-
mance of cover traffic tunneling more deeply. We find that we can take measurements
from real or simulated traffic with no tunneling and use them to estimate parameters
for an accurate analytic model of the performance impact of cover traffic tunneling.
Once validated, we use this model to better understand how delay, bandwidth, tunnel
slowdown, and stability affect cover traffic tunneling.
Finally, we take the insights from our simulation study and develop several biasing
techniques that we can use to match the cover traffic to the real traffic while simul-
taneously bounding external information leakage. We study these bias methods using
simulation and evaluate their security using a Bayesian inference attack. We find that
we can safely improve performance with biasing while preventing both traffic anal-
ysis and defense detection attacks. We then apply these biasing methods to the real
TrafficMimic implementation and evaluate it on the Internet. We find that biasing can
provide 3-5x improvement in bandwidth for bulk transfers and 2.5-9.5x speedup for
Web browsing over tunneling without biasing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As more sensitive information is transmitted over computer networks, there has been
a steady increase in the deployment of encryption to protect data in-flight. Encryp-
tion is critical to e-commerce and has been key to the broad impact and success of
the Internet. Myriad encrypted network protocols have emerged (e.g., [1–4]) that en-
able applications like encrypted Web browsing, VPNs, secure shells, and VoIP. Though
encrypted protocols have been implemented at every layer of the OSI model, in this
work we focus primarily on SSL/TLS1, the most common application-layer end-to-end
encrypted protocol used on the Internet.
Since the data payload of an encrypted protocol is protected by strong encryption, at-
tackers use the information leaked by side channels to recover the contents or intent of
the plaintext traffic. This type of attack, called traffic analysis, uses the sizes and timing
of packets sent across the network. Though traffic analysis has been a well-studied spy-
ing technique for many decades, it has recently found applications in attacking Internet
traffic.
To further motivate this problem, consider the following example of traffic analysis
of encrypted Web browsing using the HTTPS protocol. Figure 1.1 depicts this sce-
nario. The canonical activity of Web browsing is that a small request is followed by a
larger response. The SSL tunnel created by HTTPS does not mask this behavior. An
adversary (Alice) with appropriate access to monitor the network can see the encrypted
payloads as they cross the network. She can also see the boundaries between requests
and responses. Therefore, if Alice has access to the encrypted content on a Web site
1SSL was formally renamed TLS when it was standardized by the IETF. In this work, we use the
term SSL to refer to the SSLv3/TLSv1 protocol in use today.
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Figure 1.1: A simple example of encrypted traffic analysis of the HTTPS protocol
(for example, she and the victim (Bob) both have on-line banking accounts at the same
bank) then Alice can catalog the size of each individual object on the site. Once she
has done this, she can snoop Bob’s traffic and reliably determine the pages he has vis-
ited without directly compromising any cryptographic keys, algorithms, or protocols.
Alice can deduce, for example, that Bob transferred money because he has been to the
transfer-request and the transfer-completed pages.
Existing traffic analysis attacks can recover a wide range of information from en-
crypted communications, e.g., Web page visits [5–7], typed passwords [8, 9], speech
data [10, 11], and embedded protocols [12, 13]. Some users can tolerate such vul-
nerabilities; however, a growing number of applications (e.g., low-latency anonymity
systems and VPNs) and users (e.g., whistle-blowers and people in oppressive regimes)
need better protection from these attacks.
Existing techniques for preventing traffic analysis center on sending data with fixed
intervals and/or with fixed payload sizes. Prior work has shown that such constant-rate
techniques can result in considerable overhead [6, 10]. Furthermore, packets legiti-
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mately dropped during a constant-rate stream increase the effectiveness of flow linking
attacks in mix systems [14]. Though the constant-rate defense is effective at reducing
the information leakage that enables most traffic analysis attacks, is also clearly reveals
that a user is employing countermeasures to evade traffic analysis. This may, in itself,
result in unwanted attention and scrutiny. We call this related attack defense detection.
To resist both traffic analysis and defense detection attacks, we propose using re-
alistic cover traffic tunnels to mask the observable behavior of the real traffic to be
transmitted. Thus, the cover traffic model dictates when and how much data should
be transmitted. Real data is queued until there is cover traffic available to send it. If
there is no real data to send, the cover traffic is padded appropriately and sent. Strong
encryption prevents the attacker from separating what portions of the network commu-
nications contain real data and which are padding.
In this dissertation, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of a cover
traffic tunneling system called TrafficMimic. The following statement summarizes the
objectives of this dissertation:
Tunneling real data through realistic cover traffic models is a robust de-
fense that provides balanced performance and security against powerful
traffic analysis attacks.
Existing encrypted protocols provide minimal traffic analysis resistance in exchange
for better performance. This work provides users the option of changing this trade-
off to favor more secure communications thereby balancing security and performance
better than existing solutions.
The generality of the cover traffic model allows the user great flexibility in combat-
ing attacks. The degree of independence between the real traffic and the cover traffic
drives how probable it is for an attacker to recover information from the session. It
also influences the performance of the real traffic compared to its native performance
without tunneling. Initially, we study cover traffic processes that are independent from
the real traffic that they carry. We call these independent cover traffic models. We then
show how to loosely couple the cover traffic process to the requirements of the real
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traffic while keeping attacker observable information leakage to a minimum. We call
these biased cover traffic models.
We then show that using cover traffic models can robustly counter both traffic analy-
sis and defense detection better than constant-rate techniques. Our defenses are robust
because they correct the information leakages in current protocols and do not depend
on specific attack implementation weaknesses. Since we assume the attacker’s capabil-
ities may range from those of a stealthy intruder to the network operator, we develop
defenses that thwart even the most powerful attacks using the most advanced methods.
Specifically, we target attacks that rely on the information leaked by common end-to-
end encryption protocols currently used on the Internet (e.g., packet timing, payload
sizes, etc).
To address these research challenges, we utilize simulation, analytic modeling, sta-
tistical machine learning, and full system implementations. Since this work has direct
applicability to real privacy enhancing technologies, we ensure that the results of our
research are focused on practicality. This includes developing and testing usable sys-
tem implementations with quantifiable risks to attack and utilizing real network trace
data to drive the learning and attack processes.
1.1 Structure of the Dissertation
The structure of this dissertation is as follows: The remainder of Chapter 1 covers
the motivation and threat model for our work. This includes a review of recent traffic
analysis attacks and their effectiveness. We then develop a threat model that favors the
attacker in terms of access and resources.
In Chapter 2, we describe the design and implementation of our cover traffic tunnel-
ing system: TrafficMimic. We present methods for generating realistic cover traffic,
borrowing from prior work on traffic generation from the simulation and modeling
research community [15]. Since the quality of the cover traffic in our work is security-
sensitive, we describe how existing traffic generators need to be modified to ensure they
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do not leak information. We then describe the system design and C++ implementation
details of TrafficMimic. We also present a practical application of TrafficMimic by
integrating cover traffic tunneling with Tor [16].
Chapter 3 contains an evaluation of the security and performance properties of our
system implementation of TrafficMimic. We develop several protocol classification and
anomaly detection attacks that are based, in part, on recent research in this area [12,13,
17]. We show that TrafficMimic is able to fool our complex traffic classification attack
91% of the rate at which it works for real traffic. To address defense detection, we
show that TrafficMimic cover traffic is indistinguishable from real traffic, even when
attacked with a classifier trained with TrafficMimic models. We also show that realistic
cover traffic can, in some cases, provide comparable performance to static constant-
rate cover traffic. We then discuss performance problems that arise from mismatches
between properties of the cover and real traffic.
In Chapter 4 we further examine the performance effects we observed in Chapter 3
using a simulation model and implementation in SSFNet [18]. We then develop a
bi-directional analytic model for independent cover traffic tunneling and validate it
using the results of our simulation study. This validated model allows us to understand
performance properties of the real traffic like slowdown and the stability of cover/real
traffic combinations.
We next investigate techniques for biasing the selection of cover traffic to better
match the real traffic being tunneled in Chapter 5. We derive several statistical and
algorithmic biasing functions and describe their implementation in a simulator. We use
this simulator along with a Bayesian inference attack to compare the bias functions’
security and performance. We study the effects of biasing on defense detection using
the two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We then evaluate biased cover traffic mod-
els in our system implementation of TrafficMimic. We observed up to 5x improvement
in bulk transfer performance and 2.5-9.5x improvement in Web site load time as com-
pared to independent cover traffic. We also found that bidirectional overhead was also
reduced using biasing. This study shows that we can safely enhance the real-world
performance of TrafficMimic using biasing.
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Num Time Del ta From To TCP f l a g s TCP i n f o
1 0 .000000 43620 > h t t p s [ PSH , ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Len=693
2 0 .037718 h t t p s > 43620 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack =694 Len=0
3 0 .467329 h t t p s > 43620 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack =694 Len=1448
4 0 .000123 h t t p s > 43620 [ACK] Seq =1449 Ack =694 Len=1448
5 0 .000023 43620 > h t t p s [ACK] Seq =694 Ack =2897 Len=0
6 0 .000092 h t t p s > 43620 [ACK] Seq =2897 Ack =694 Len=1448
7 0 .000649 h t t p s > 43620 [ACK] Seq =4345 Ack =694 Len=1448
8 0 .000018 43620 > h t t p s [ACK] Seq =694 Ack =5793 Len=0
9 0 .000091 h t t p s > 43620 [ACK] Seq =5793 Ack =694 Len=1448
10 0 .000068 h t t p s > 43620 [ PSH , ACK] Seq =7241 Ack =694 Len=658
11 0 .000014 43620 > h t t p s [ACK] Seq =694 Ack =7899 Len=0
Figure 1.2: Portion of a packet trace of HTTPS browsing taken from tshark [19]
We present a review of relevant related work in traffic analysis attacks, attack pre-
vention, and network traffic generation in Chapter 6. We then conclude and describe
future work in Chapter 7.
1.2 Traffic Analysis Threats
To establish effective techniques for preventing traffic analysis, we first examine the
mechanics of precisely what information is currently leaked by encrypted protocols.
We do so using an example taken from a portion of an HTTPS connection. We show
the output in a format similar to that of Wireshark [19] in Figure 1.2.
The first information we can readily glean from this trace is that the two hosts are
communicating over the HTTPS protocol. Unless being used in concert with a proxy,
tunnel, or VPN service, current encrypted protocols do not directly obscure who is
communicating. When used for a VPN, encrypted protocols may obscure the exact
end-points of the communications since the IP headers are also encrypted. However,
an attacker is still able to tell the end-points of the VPN (i.e., what organization hosts
it). In our work, we do not prevent the attacker from determining the end points of
the communications because existing work on anonymous relays and Internet blocking
resistance can provide this.
The next thing we can observe from the above trace is the timing of the packets.
Since we collected this trace at the client, we can observe round trip time of the first
data packet as approximately 38ms. We can also see when the client and server send
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data. The next thing we can observe is the length of the payloads in the packets. We
can tell that the client sent a total of 693 bytes and the server sent 7898 bytes in this
portion of the trace.
Using the information we have observed so far, we can apply what we know of the
normal operation of HTTP to reconstruct what is taking place. We see that a GET
request was likely sent in packet 1. Using the timing of the packets, we deduce that
the server processing time was approximately 467 ms. In a typical HTTP connection,
the server sends back HTTP response headers and the content requested. We collected
the response headers by crawling over one million pages from the Internet and found
them to have a mean length of 212 bytes. Thus, we estimate the size of the object re-
quested was approximately 7686 bytes (7898-212). After examining the corresponding
plaintext session, we found our estimates from the encrypted session to be within close
margins.
1.3 Related Work on Traffic Analysis Attacks
As evidenced by the preceding example, encrypted protocols can leak considerable
amounts of information. Encrypted traffic analysis has been the subject of research
since the advent of encrypted Internet protocols [20, 21]. To further understand this
threat, we next present a taxonomy of traffic analysis against Internet encrypted proto-
cols.
1.3.1 Anonymity Attacks
Anonymity systems are a common target for traffic analysis attacks. By hiding infor-
mation about each user’s identity, anonymity systems force attackers to use side chan-
nels to glean information about user identity. Raymond provides an overview of traffic
analysis techniques against anonymity systems [22]. One such side channel attack is
to correlate traffic patterns entering and leaving an anonymity system [23,24]. Hintz et
al. demonstrated a different type of attack on the SafeWeb system [25] that utilized a
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HTTP protocol-specific attack (similar to those described in Section 1.3.4).
Zhu and Bettati developed another class of anonymity attacks they call flow sepa-
ration [26]. They use blind source separation techniques to distinguish different flows
inside a mix network. While their attack does not violate anonymity directly, their
techniques make it easier to apply traffic analysis techniques on mixed traffic.
There are two approaches to using cover traffic in anonymity systems: link padding
and end-to-end padding. Link padding ensures that a passive adversary observing traffic
between the routers is unable to learn any information about the flows being carried.
The use of realistic cover traffic in this scenario would help hide the fact that a router
is forwarding anonymous traffic. Link padding, of course, does not provide a defense
against compromised routers. End-to-end padding can be used to address this problem,
but it is vulnerable to network perturbations, intentional or otherwise, that introduce
distinct patterns in different flows [27]. An end-to-end realistic cover stream used by an
anonymity system will likewise not help resist traffic analysis aimed to link anonymous
flows, as each stream will have a distinct signature, but it will help protect from other
attacks described below.
1.3.2 Stepping Stone Detection
Traffic analysis is also used to detect stepping stones [28], which are compromised
computers that are used to relay malicious traffic to hide its true origin. The method-
ologies used are often similar to traffic analysis in anonymous communication net-
works [29,30]. In this scenario, constant-rate cover traffic is likely to arouse suspicion.
Donoho et al. [31] suggested constraining the cover traffic distribution to preserve a
Pareto inter-arrival distribution and studied detection mechanisms that exploit this con-
straint, while Blum et al. analyzed using cover traffic following a Poisson process [32].
Realistic cover traffic would, of course, be the stealthiest approach to avoiding stepping
stone detection.
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1.3.3 Protocol Detection
Protocol detection is increasingly important both for security and for operational rea-
sons. Intrusion detection systems with appropriate knowledge of the protocol may be
better able to analyze traffic [33]. Also, it may be necessary to identify unknown pro-
tocols and subject them to further examination or a specialized routing policy (e.g.,
VoIP). Many protocol detection techniques are based upon examining the content of
the traffic data [34].
The contents are obscured in encrypted protocols, so more sophisticated methods
must be employed. Moore and Zuev use a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier to classify individual
flows using flow length, port numbers, and inter-flow time [17]. Wright et al. use hidden
Markov models to identify encrypted and plaintext protocols using only packet timing
and size [35]. They address some of the difficulties in utilizing so few features (time and
size) in encrypted protocols, but still find that detection can be error-prone. They also
propose methods for identifying traffic using aggregates of size information only [13].
They use the K-nearest-neighbor algorithm in conjunction with the Kullback-Leibler
divergence to classify traffic aggregates collected in ten second intervals.
The work by Dhamankar and King used a large set of features (such as client/server
traffic ratio, entropy, and standard deviation of request/response times) [12]. They
also used a different classification mechanism by doing K-means clustering and then
nearest neighbor using both Euclidean and Mahalanobis distance metrics. Their results
focused on VoIP traffic (specifically Skype), but they were also successful at detecting
other UDP protocols, such as NetBIOS, within small error margins.
While most cover traffic techniques are effective at preventing protocol detection,
realistic cover traffic can be tuned so that a particular cover protocol is recognized. This
is especially relevant since corporations and governments are now employing network
anomaly detection systems (NADS) to track encrypted traffic usage. This technology
can be used to enforce network security policies, such as preventing unauthorized VPN
connections or catching malware command and control channels. Several commercial
vendors offer NADS products including Securify, PacketMotion, Mazu Networks, and
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Arbor Networks.
1.3.4 Protocol-Specific Attacks
A common attack against HTTPS is to identify the web site being browsed when the
destination address is not available (e.g., when using an anonymous proxy) [36]. Initial
approaches used individual object sizes to identify pages on the Internet [7] or correlate
links across pages [37]. Later work added packet inter-arrival times to the prior metrics
to identify which site a user was browsing [5]. The attack decreases in accuracy as
the time between training the model and applying it to test traffic increases. Libera-
tore and Levine went on to evaluate several techniques for identifying encrypted HTTP
streams [6]. For their techniques, they found a much smaller reduction in attack accu-
racy than prior work as the time between training and attack grew. Shi et al. propose
another mechanism for identifying a site through a trace of encrypted browsing [38].
The novelty of their approach is to represent a browsing session as a vector of connec-
tion counts and data volumes transferred on each connection. They then use a support
vector machine to classify the session vectors and differentiate Web sites. Herrmann et
al. studied a Multinomial Naı¨ve Bayes classifier on several different types of encrypted
proxy systems. They also studied some of the difficulties associated with false positives
and browser caching.
Monrose and Rubin discovered that by examining the keystroke timing behavior,
they could extract the text being typed into a real-time system [8]. Song et al. used
this idea to extract typed passwords (from stepping-stone connections) and commands
from SSH sessions [9].
Because of its quality of service and bandwidth requirements, detecting VoIP is of
interest to network operators. Indeed, this was the primary motivation for the work of
Dhamankar and King [12]. Wright et al. have taken detection further to try to infer the
language being spoken using only features of the encrypted packets being sent [11].
The variable bit-rate encoders used by many VoIP schemes leak information in packet
sizes because the different sounds that make up speech are encoded differently. With
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a simple classifier they were able to achieve up to 90% accuracy for many languages.
They also used hidden Markov models to detect some spoken phrases without the need
to train on audio samples of the speaker [10].
Realistic cover traffic models can be used to destroy the specific features extracted by
the above attacks while preserving the overall traffic model. For example, by using an
HTTPS model to generate cover traffic for an HTTPS session, protocol identification
will correctly classify the activity, but a website identification will be misled.
1.4 Threat Model
To establish the effectiveness of our prevention techniques, we use a threat model that
is specific to preventing certain types of traffic analysis and favors the attacker in terms
of resources and access. We focus on obscuring the timing, payload sizes, and behav-
ior patterns of encrypted traffic. We are not able to reduce the amount of data to be
sent, but we can obscure its semantics from the attacker. We assume the attacker may
passively observe traffic at any point after it has been encrypted and may do so with
high-precision timing. We assume that the attacker cannot directly compromise any
encryption key or algorithm and must focus on side-channel analysis. We also consider
the adversary to have considerable resources at his/her disposal and to have no need to
be stealthy. Our system does not obscure who is communicating or whether two parties
are communicating at all. However, when used with an anonymity network, proxy, or
covert channel, which can prevent flow linking, our work is capable of minimizing the
information an attacker can recover from any type of known traffic analysis attack.
Since protocol classification may be required for an attacker to know which protocol-
specific attacks to carry out, we focus on preventing protocol classification attacks.
Protocol classification is also central to conducting and defending against the defense
detection attack. Thus, we use a supervised learning protocol identification traffic anal-
ysis attack. We assume that the attacker has access to generic network traces with which
he/she trains the protocol identification attack. The attacker then uses this trained clas-
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sifier against specific target networks and hosts. We also use an unsupervised-learning
method to identify protocol anomalies (i.e., constant-rate traffic flowing over a port
which usually contains a real protocol). We describe the design and implementation of
these attacks in more detail in Section 3.1.
Finally, we note that in addition to malicious attacks on user privacy, there are many
scenarios where traffic analysis plays a benevolent role in network security. For exam-
ple, network operators may use traffic analysis to perform network policy enforcement
and intrusion detection thereby improving security for their users. Network policies that
forbid unauthorized outbound virtual private networks can protect internal resources
from attack and help mitigate exfiltration of sensitive information. To alleviate the con-
fusion over the ambiguous motivations of those doing traffic analysis, we assume that
those conducting the attack are the adversaries.
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CHAPTER 2
TRAFFICMIMIC DESIGN
The primary purpose of TrafficMimic is to prevent traffic analysis attacks, like those
discussed in Section 1.2. Since these attacks use the information (e.g., packet sizes
and timing) that SSL and other end-to-end encryption protocols leak, we must leak
as little information as possible from TrafficMimic. The most basic approach to stop
information leakage is to map the real traffic onto a simple flat protocol model like
constant-rate. Indeed, this method has been used with success in mitigating traffic anal-
ysis attacks in prior work [6, 10, 25, 37]. However, using such simple protocol models
appears anomalous and is easily detectable by the adversary. To ensure responsive and
efficient communications, constant-rate traffic must be emitted at the maximum desired
rate all the time, resulting in considerable overhead. Furthermore, these methods are
difficult to tune due to their mismatch with real Internet protocols (and excessive tuning
may result in information leakage of its own).
To best address the problems with existing traffic analysis resistance, we use realistic
protocol behavior models to generate cover traffic rather than constant-rate traffic. Us-
ing realistic models allows a user to ensure the attacker sees the protocol behaviors that
are expected of the port, user, or location, thwarting defense detection. Realistic mod-
els can also provide performance advantages, especially with respect to excess padding
overhead.
Realistic cover traffic models can either be independent or dependent of the real
traffic flowing through them. When using an independent cover traffic model, Traf-
ficMimic provides the same strong level of traffic analysis resistance as constant-rate
models while simultaneously preventing defense detection. In Chapter 5 we study how
to relax independent models while quantifying the information loss.
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The overhead incurred by using an independent realistic model varies greatly de-
pending on the properties of the cover traffic and the requirements of the real traffic.
However, similar to how the simple models may be tuned via parameters, the user may
select an independent model based upon his/her requirements for tunneled real traf-
fic. A good deal of automatic tuning/fitting takes place when using the same model
for cover traffic as the real traffic. For example, a user may tunnel his/her real Web
browsing session over independent Web browsing cover traffic.
2.1 Secure Traffic Generation
So far, we have espoused that using realistic cover traffic has certain security benefits.
However, this assumption is highly dependent on the quality of the generated cover traf-
fic (i.e., how realistic is it?). Studying relevant work in realistic traffic generation from
the simulation and performance analysis communities revealed that generating truly
realistic traffic is complex and highly dependent on the beholder’s idea of what fea-
tures are important to realism. For example, it is often important for traffic generators
used for network algorithm testing to properly emulate network link congestion [15] or
for traffic generators used to test Web servers to properly exercise the caching mecha-
nism [39].
Our goals in using realistic cover traffic are i) to minimize information leaks from the
real traffic and ii) to ensure that the synthetic traffic of a given protocol is indistinguish-
able from actual traffic of that protocol. Since our application of traffic generation is
security-sensitive due to defense detection attacks, we found that we needed a different
set of requirements than those of previous work. We call this set of requirements and
goals secure traffic generation.
We consider secure traffic generation to have two phases: learning and playback.
Secure traffic generation shares many requirements for both learning and playback with
existing traffic generators used for a variety of purposes. These include the requirement
for realistic modeling of think time, objects passing over the network, and connections.
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We next describe how secure traffic generation differs from existing work on traffic
generation. We describe each of the requirements and the rationale behind them below.
1. Network Agnostic and Responsive We do not consider link or network prop-
erties to be a part of a secure traffic generation model because we want it to
be responsive to actual network conditions when it is used for tunneling. Indeed,
improperly responding to network conditions could enable a defense detection at-
tack. Thus, when extracting information from network traces, we must be careful
to focus on features that are salient to the protocol’s behavior and minimize the
effects any particular network has on learning secure protocol models. We gen-
erate protocol behavior models at the application layer so that they can actively
react to congestion and load dynamically. We believe that models generated only
from packet-level information (e.g., inter-packet timing) or that are played back
using “open-loop” UDP traffic generators (e.g., Harpoon [40]) are not suitable
for secure traffic generation.
2. Quality/Type of Training Secure traffic generation is only as good as its input
data. Thus, it is important to ensure the training data is free of significant packet
loss, inconsistencies, and route asymmetry. It is also important that the train-
ing data be recent to ensure that it will thwart defense detection attacks. Our
experience with several freely-available anonymized packet traces used in this
work indicate that, while suitable for supporting our work, these traces fall short
for real use in an adversarial environment due to several of these quality issues.
Lastly, since secure traffic generation involves a learning phase (in our design
using a network trace), care should be taken to mitigate training-based attacks,
which attempt to skew the learned model for the attacker’s purposes. Others have
studied this idea in the context of evading intrusion detection [41,42], and we find
it similarly applicable to secure traffic generation.
3. Synchronized Traffic Generation between Hosts Differing from the previous
two requirements, which focus on the learning phase, this requirement is rele-
vant instead to the playback of secure traffic models. Since secure traffic models
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Table 2.1: Features collected by Swing [15]
InterConn Time between connections
numpairs Number of req/resp exchanges per connection
req/resp The size of individual requests and responses
reqthink Wait time between exchanges on a connection
are bidirectional, we find that it is important that we use a single synchronized
generator to create a cover traffic tunnel. The inconsistencies and anomalies that
result from having two independent (or even semi-independent) traffic genera-
tors at either end of a secure tunnel can enable several defense detection attacks.
Thus, secure traffic generation must ensure statistical, aggregate, and very spe-
cific heuristic properties of the modeled protocol.
To build the learning phase of our secure traffic generator we make use of structural
models of observable protocol/network behavior. Structural models are a common tech-
nique used for simulation and performance testing of networks [43]. Structural models
attempt to mimic the real interactions between the layers that generate network traffic
(e.g., network, protocol, application, user). We use Swing, a recent network traffic gen-
erator [15], to create realistic protocol behavior models. Swing uses a structural model
that includes user, session, connection, packet, and network sub-models to generate
realistic traffic for network emulations. It does so by analyzing dumped network trace
files and extracting empirical CDFs of structural features. Table 2.1 gives the features
from Swing we used and their descriptions.
We discard the network-level details of the Swing models to ensure that they remain
network agnostic. Some network timing attributes still leak into the structural models
we use. Since, network-specific delays are likely to be small compared to both user
and session timing, this is effect is minimal. However, some application layer timing
information (e.g., reqthink) may be fine-grained enough to be affected by network-
specific delays.
At first, we underestimated the effect that the quality of the input data to Swing would
have on its ability reliably perform secure traffic generation. Network traces collected
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from high-bandwidth links, like those we use in this work, are often very difficult to
process because of packet loss, routing anomalies, network scans, and end-device TCP
stack implementation differences. Since Swing aggregates traffic properties across con-
nections of a single port it observes in a trace, we found that the models it produces in-
clude data from malformed connections. Furthermore, Swing sometimes mis-handled
TCP stream reassembly (e.g., it counts TCP phantom bytes as real transmissions) and
was unable process to non-Ethernet link layer traces. While these problems have min-
imal impact on Swing in its primary purpose as a performance evaluation tool, we
need to carefully sanitize input traces to preserve the security of the traffic generation
process.
We developed a set of trace sanitization tools, which perform the following tasks:
• Remove connections where only one direction was observed. While these con-
nections halves have some valuable information, the loss request/response corre-
lation significantly skews Swing models.
• Remove connections with significant packet loss. These connections stress the
end-device TCP stack and often expose non-fatal anomalies that are hard for
Swing to properly reconstruct.
• Remove connections with only a few bytes transmitted. These connections are
often result of network scans and do not contain enough real information to war-
rant retention.
• Reconstruct link-layer headers on which Swing depends. This ensures that Swing
can track the direction of packets and correlate activities in both directions.
This preprocessing ensures that we only generate models from a set of cleansed con-
nections that can be safely used with Swing.
We ensure synchronized playback of the models extracted by Swing using asyn-
chronous generation threads and a lightweight inter-node communication mechanism
for specifying generated traffic. We describe this system and the operation of the Traf-
ficMimic tunnel next.
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Figure 2.1: Tunneling real traffic through model-based cover traffic using TrafficMimic
2.2 Playback and Tunneling
TrafficMimic is a cover traffic playback system that incorporates a tunnel of real user
traffic inside cover traffic. TrafficMimic is a TCP connection forwarding proxy service
(it can also support UDP traffic over TCP cover traffic). TrafficMimic accepts connec-
tions via local/remote port forwarding, SOCKS, or HTTP CONNECT protocols and
forwards all data sent and received over the input port across an encrypted tunnel.
To use TrafficMimic, the user must have TrafficMimic nodes at both end points of
the communication. The remote TrafficMimic node removes the added control and
padding information and delivers the decrypted data to the destination; likewise, data
from the destination is embedded in cover traffic, encrypted, and padded at the remote
node and decrypted by the local TrafficMimic node. As outlined in the threat model,
we assume that the attacker can only see the encrypted traffic between the TrafficMimic
hosts. Figure 2.1 shows the architecture of TrafficMimic.
Both endpoints of a TrafficMimic tunnel share the same design. We refer to the
node accepting connections to forward as the tm-client and the end point connecting to
destination hosts as the tm-server. To ensure synchronized cover traffic generation, a
single node controls the generation of cover traffic for both nodes. We call this node
the master and the other node the slave. The master may be at the tm-server or the
tm-client. Since the master controls all cover traffic generation, the bidirectional cover
traffic model can incorporate synchronized actions and predefined sub-sequences that
would not be possible with two independent cover traffic generators at the tunnel end-
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points.
All cover traffic generation is performed in terms of traffic requests. A traffic request
is a specification for what cover traffic TrafficMimic nodes will generate on a tunnel. A
traffic request contains four elements: a type, a unique ID, a size, and a time. The type
dictates whether the request is to send data or open/close/reconnect a connection. The
size parameter specifies the number of bytes to send and the relative time parameter
tells the system when to perform the requested action. The unique ID allows the master
and slave to synchronize.
Each TrafficMimic node contains an asynchronous thread that handles the generation
and processing of cover traffic. To create cover traffic, the master model thread uses
Swing features to create model requests, which consist of a traffic request to be sent
to the slave and a model response, which contains zero or more traffic requests that
the slave should send back. TrafficMimic creates an appropriately sized output buffer
according to the model request. TrafficMimic then embeds the model response and
any real user data to be sent across the tunnel into the buffer. If additional space still
remains, TrafficMimic pads it to the model-specified length. This buffer is then sent to
the slave over an SSL-encrypted channel.
Upon receiving model responses from the master, the slave sleeps as specified and
instructs its core network event loop to connect/disconnect the tunnel and to send data
at the appropriate times. The slave uses the same process for merging control traffic,
padding, and real user data as the master to create a bidirectional channel.
To allow the master initiated cover traffic to be synchronized with the data the slave
sends back, the master model thread assigns a unique ID to each traffic request it gen-
erates. When the slave sends data back to the master, it includes the ID of the traffic
request that it received to generate that data. This allows the master to wait for the
responses from the slave to be sent back before proceeding with generating additional
cover traffic.
Since master model threads are asynchronous from the rest of the proxy system and
contain built-in synchronization, they are straightforward to write. Consider the simple
model thread in Figure 2.2. Each call to sendModelRequest blocks until the associated
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Figure 2.2: Psuedocode showing the implementation of a simple model thread
whi le True {
/ / i n s t r u c t ma s t e r t o c r e a t e a new c o v e r c o n n e c t i o n
t 1 = new T r a f f i c R e q u e s t (CONNECT)
sendModelReques t ( new ModelRequest ( t 1 ) )
/ / i n s t r u c t ma s t e r t o send 500 b y t e s i m m e d i a t e l y
t 2 = new T r a f f i c R e q u e s t (SEND DATA, 500)
m = new ModelRequest ( t 2 )
/ / c r e a t e a c o n t a i n e r f o r s l a v e r e s p o n s e s
r e s p = new ModelResponse ( )
/ / i n s t r u c t s l a v e t o send 1000 b y t e s a f t e r 20ms
r e s p . add ( new T r a f f i c R e q u e s t (SEND DATA, 1000 , 2 0 ) )
/ / i n s t r u c t s l a v e t o e x p e c t t o be d i s c o n n e c t e d from t h e m as t e r
r e s p . add ( new T r a f f i c R e q u e s t (WAIT DISCONNECT ) )
/ / a s s o c i a t e t h e r e s p o n s e s w i t h t h e ma s t e r r e q u e s t
m. s e t R e s p o n s e ( r e s p )
/ / send t h e ma s t e r r e q u e s t and 2 s l a v e r e s p o n s e s
sendModelReques t (m)
/ / D i s c o n n e c t c o v e r c o n n e c t i o n
t 3 = new T r a f f i c R e q u e s t (DISCONNECT)
sendModelReques t ( new ModelRequest ( t 3 ) )
/ / pause b e f o r e b e g i n n i n g a new c o v e r c o n n e c t i o n
s l e e p ( 1 )
}
action is complete. Furthermore, the model thread may simply sleep to emulate think
time rather than requiring more complex synchronization with the main event loop.
Thus, the master model thread is very general and easy to program for a wide variety
of protocols while avoiding complex synchronization problems.
2.3 Implementation
Our TrafficMimic implementation consists of approximately 9,000 source lines of C++.
TrafficMimic shares the configuration options and syntax for port forwarding, HTTP
Connect, and SOCKS 4/4a/5 proxy servers with the OpenSSH client to ease adop-
tion [44]. Users can integrate TrafficMimic with many standard applications that na-
tively support proxies (e.g., most Web browsers, instant messengers, IRC clients, etc...)
or with applications that do not natively support proxies using transparent solutions like
proxychains, tsocks, or WinGate.
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TrafficMimic uses two object interfaces for managing data: messages and fragments.
Both are tied to a lightweight serialization interface, which allows objects to be con-
verted into a heavily-packed byte array and efficiently moved across network sockets
and IPC pipes. Messages are high-level objects that implement the functionality of
TrafficMimic. They support sending real data through the tunnel, sending padding, re-
solving addresses, and connecting remote/local hosts using the TrafficMimic forward-
ing protocol.
Messages are divided into fragments when they are sent over the tunnel. This allows
messages to be arbitrarily split across different transmissions and even across different
TCP connections. Each fragment contains a very small header (as small as 2 bytes
using varint integers [45]), model response data, and some portion of a message. We
always encode model response data into each fragment to ensure that cover traffic gen-
eration continues even in cover traffic models with very small packets. The fragment
serialization interface allows fragments as small as 8 bytes. Since encrypted block ci-
phers that are part of SSL and other encrypted protocols use 8 byte or greater block
sizes, we can precisely mimic most encrypted traffic with TrafficMimic.
TrafficMimic uses an event loop powered by the select system call to monitor all
in-use sockets. As stated earlier, TrafficMimic uses asynchronous model threads (im-
plemented using pthreads) to govern traffic generation at the master and slave. These
threads utilize IPC pipes and the same serialization interface used for external connec-
tions to asynchronously communicate traffic requests to the main network event loop.
The main event loop communicates back to the model threads (for full traffic generation
synchronization) with blocking feedback queues.
2.3.1 Tor Integration
The Tor project is an excellent candidate for integration with TrafficMimic because of
its goal of traffic analysis resistance and anonymity [16]. Tor provides traffic analysis
resistance by forwarding traffic through a set of anonymous relays. However Tor is
vulnerable to both traffic analysis and defense detections that TrafficMimic mitigates.
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Figure 2.3: Using TrafficMimic end-to-end with Tor
It is especially vulnerable on the link between the Tor user and the first relay in the Tor
network (first hop link). An attacker can reconstruct some information about a user’s
activities by monitoring this link (e.g., Web site identification [46]). Furthermore, an
attacker can locate and block Tor traffic using a defense detection attack on this or any
Tor link because of the unique SSL network fingerprint of Tor traffic [47].
Since TrafficMimic uses standard proxy initiation mechanisms with which Tor is
compatible, we are able to integrate TrafficMimic into the Tor anonymity network in
several ways. First, we can run TrafficMimic end-to-end over the Tor network, prevent-
ing first-hop traffic analysis attacks and making flow linking attacks by a global passive
adversary considerably more difficult. Second, we can use TrafficMimic to protect in-
dividual Tor links between relays and users, preventing identification and blocking of
Tor.
The usage model for using TrafficMimic end-to-end with Tor is as follows. The user
instructs TrafficMimic to cover his/her protocol behaviors with realistic cover traffic
before it enters the Tor network. The TrafficMimic covered data then traverses the Tor
network eventually arriving at an exit-enabled Onion Router (OR). TrafficMimic runs
locally on this OR and performs the final connection to the destination. To support
this type of integration, we enhanced TrafficMimic to support the SOCKS protocol as
a client as well as a server. Figure 2.3 shows the components of Tor and TrafficMimic
and how they interconnect.
To help users who wish to use TrafficMimic with Tor, we add a special TrafficMimic
exit policy that is propagated through the Tor directory. We do this by making a small
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(3 line) change to the code of each OR that also runs a tm-server. We use an unallocated
IP address (e.g., 0.0.0.1) as a placeholder in the exit policy for connecting to the Traf-
ficMimic node. The OR code change maps this address to localhost to ensure that users
can talk to the tm-server. Since this unallocated IP address will propagate through the
Tor directory, users may connect to Tor using TrafficMimic without the need to change
their Tor OP software, intermediate ORs, or the Tor directory, providing a path for
incremental deployment.
There is some potential benefit to removing cover traffic in the middle of a Tor path,
rather than at the last hop, since it would make traffic analysis at the entry and exit
nodes (rather than by an external observer) more difficult. However, this would require
a more significant modification to the Tor architecture.
The second integration protects individual SSL connections used by Tor. This pre-
vents both traffic analysis and defense detection attacks for any link forwarded over
TrafficMimic. Consider the example of a user protecting his/her first-hop link to Tor
(Figure 2.4). The user configures his/her OP to connect to the local tm-client using the
HTTPSProxy Tor configuration option (ReachableAddresses and FacistFirewall
might be also necessary). The TrafficMimic-enabled entry guard OR should advertise
port n for relay connections using the ORPort option while actually configuring the re-
lay to listen on a different port m using ORListenAddress. The tm-server should listen
on port n and forward incoming connections to localhost:m. This process will transpar-
ently inject TrafficMimic protection into any Tor link without changes to the directory
service. To address some blocking-resistance problems, Tor bridge nodes (unpublished
one-hop relays into the Tor network) can also use this technique.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented the design and implementation of TrafficMimic, a
system to resist traffic analysis by generating realistic cover traffic. TrafficMimic is
able to both hide details about the traffic generated by users and also prevent defense
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Figure 2.4: Using TrafficMimic to protect individual Tor links from detection and traffic
analysis
detection by using realistic traffic models that do not appear anomalous. We discussed
the requirements and our implementation of secure traffic generation using Swing. We
also present the system architecture and implementation details of TrafficMimic that
support easy-to-write traffic generation threads and careful synchronization. Lastly, we
presented several usable integrations of TrafficMimic into the Tor anonymity network
that improve its resistance to both traffic analysis and blocking attacks.
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CHAPTER 3
INDEPENDENT COVER TRAFFIC
EVALUATION
We evaluate TrafficMimic in two aspects: its security properties and the performance of
using it for tunneling real traffic. We use three sets of network traces to train models and
test our classification attacks. We use data from the CAIDA Anonymized 2009 Internet
Traces Dataset [48] (January and February hour-long traces from the equinix-chicago
monitor). Since we were unable to reconstruct a sufficient number of bidirectional
SSH connections from these CAIDA traces, we also used several hour-long traces col-
lected by the University of North Carolina on their campus-wide border link in April
2003 [49]. As an independent validation set, we also use one hour of traffic collected
from Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) border gateway link in Sept 2009.
We use several wide-area links to evaluate both security and performance (see Ta-
ble 3.1). We run TrafficMimic nodes on the endpoints of these links and evaluate the
tunnel traffic between them. While not fully representative of the Internet, these links
vary enough to prove the effectiveness of our approach and its resistance to attack.
In future work, we could evaluate TrafficMimic with more wide-area links by using
PlanetLab [50].
Since Tor is likely to make protocol classification and other attacks more diffi-
cult [46], the results we present are a best case for the attacker. Tor likewise has a
considerable impact on performance [51] that we plan to investigate in future work.
3.1 Traffic Classification Attack
To evaluate our traffic analysis resistance mechanisms we build upon existing attack
methods [12, 13, 17]. In this section, we describe the design of our classification attack
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Table 3.1: Wide-area test links
Label Client Server RTT
MN-UK Montreal London 85ms
IL-CA Illinois California 63ms
Table 3.2: Features extracted by the trace analysis system for use in our classification
attack
Bytes Sent Bytes Received
Mean Sent Pkt IAT Mean Received Pkt IAT
Variance Sent Pkt IAT Variance Received Pkt IAT
Number of Exchanges Inter-Exchange Time
Connection Duration
and its performance classifying real traffic. We later use this attack to validate secure
traffic generation in Section 3.2.
The goal of the classification attack is to label a single connection of an unknown
encrypted protocol with its plaintext protocol identity. Conservatively, we assume that
we cannot use any information from the payload. Our classifier employs supervised
learning and the weighted K nearest neighbor (K-NN) algorithm. For each example
in the test set, our implementation calculates the Euclidean distance to each training
example finding the K nearest neighbors. We then weight the neighbors according to
their distance and classify each test sample based on the class with the highest weight.
In our experiments, we found that values of K greater than 3 did not improve and in
some cases reduced the overall accuracy of our classifier. Thus, we use K = 3 in all the
following results.
We selected some standard features from the work Dhamankar and King [12] and
Moore and Zuev [17]. We augmented these features with several features that showed
promise for being salient in detecting differences between protocols (see Table 3.2 for
the full list). The first of such new features relate to protocol exchanges. We define
an exchange as a subsequence of network communications within a single connection
where the initiator and responder both send data (i.e., one or more packets with non-
zero payloads). This is similar to the concept of pairs in the work of Vishwanath and
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Vahdat [15]. To reconstruct exchanges, we merge together all data packets that flow
in one direction as one half of an exchange. When a data packet is sent back by the
other peer, the second half of the exchange begins. This process repeats as the flow of
data packets alternates between the initiator and responder. Though they do not cover
all possible protocol interactions, exchanges capture the great majority of common
protocol idioms. Refer to Figure 3.1 for a diagram of the exchange state machine and
an example of how to determine exchange boundaries. We also use the total duration of
the connection as a feature. In some cases, the length of our hour-long traces artificially
limited this feature, though we still found it to improve classification performance. We
experimented with various types of individual packet size related features, but we found
that they were too noisy to improve the attack.
To extract relevant features from each TCP connection, we process packet traces
using libpcap and perform TCP stream reassembly to avoid errors introduced by lost,
delayed, and reordered packets. We use standard techniques to identify and in some
cases infer when TCP connections are established [15]. We consider the initiator of the
TCP connection (the party who sends the initial SYN packet) to be the sender and all
data sent back to the initiator from the responder to be received data. For example, in
a connection where a browser connects to a Web server, the data sent by the initiator
(browser) is the HTTP request and the data received from the responder (Web server)
is the HTML or other Web content requested. Although our trace analysis system does
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not support IP fragmentation, we found comparably few instances of fragmentation in
the Internet traces we analyzed.
To support the scale of our input traces (on the order of 100 million packets), we
created a custom feature extraction tool. By using careful resource control on the hash
tables and lists we used to track connection status, our Java-based analysis system is
able to process around one hundred thousand packet headers per second.
Since these features have vastly different units (e.g., seconds vs. bytes), we use
z-scoring to standardize the values to a common range. To compute the z-score, we
estimate the population standard deviation and mean using sampling from the training
set. We used matrix conditioning to evaluate our choice of features. We use the matrix
condition number for a normal matrix A given by
ce =
λmax(A)
λmin(A)
(3.1)
where λmin and λmax are the smallest and largest eigenvalues of A respectively. We
consider a matrix with a ce value roughly similar to its number of features to be well
conditioned. We also used the trace of the inverse correlation matrix of A to identify re-
dundant features. Using the full set of features from Table 3.2, we found the combined
CAIDA and UNC training data to have a favorable ce equal to 22.8.
3.1.1 Validation
We tested our classifier using cross-validation by training and testing data from the
same network link at different times. We classified connections collected from CAIDA
in February to those collected from January and from UNC on April 20 to April 29. To
make the attack more realistic, we also tested the performance of our traffic classifier by
training on traffic from one network (from CAIDA and UNC) and applying it against
data collected from an entirely different network (from LANL). This approach differs
from that taken by previous traffic identification work that used cross-validation of a
single network link. Indeed, such generalization should reduce the accuracy and fidelity
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Table 3.3: Results of traffic classification using K-NN classifier
Protocol Accuracy F-score
SSH 95.1% 0.886
STMP 88.7% 0.863
HTTPS 90.5% 0.874
of the techniques. Despite this, we feel that this threat model is most appropriate for an
attacker wishing to perform wide-scale traffic analysis. Furthermore, we have designed
our classifier such that it captures and compares features of the protocol’s behavior and
minimal information that are side effects of the network. We are the first to evaluate a
generic traffic classification attack in this manner.
We focus on three common Internet protocols: HTTPS, SMTP, and SSH. Each rep-
resents a varying degree of interactivity, bulk transfer, and other protocol variations.
As in previous work [13,34], we use known port numbers to label our training and test
sets. While this labeling mechanism is not strictly guaranteed to be correct (as our work
demonstrates), we have achieved high classification performance in testing, minimizing
the concern of mislabeling. Since the protocols we wished to analyze did not occur in
the traces with equal probability, we employed random sampling to construct training
and test sets for our classifier that had comparable numbers of connections from each
protocol.1
We show the results of the single-link cross validation test in Table 3.3. The overall
accuracy of the cross-validation CAIDA test of was greater than 91% and compares
favorably with existing work using similar methods [12, 13, 17]. Since accuracy does
not entirely reflect the performance of the classifier with respect to false positives and
false negatives, we also report the F-score. The F-score is the harmonic mean of the
precision and recall of the classifier and captures how many samples are missed and
how many are incorrectly labeled simultaneously. We found the F-scores to be very
good (>0.86) in this test.
Using the independent LANL trace, we found that the accuracy and F-score of our
1An attacker with a non-uniform prior probability of protocols carried by encrypted traffic would
need to alter this methodology.
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Table 3.4: Classification attack results validated with LANL data
Protocol Accuracy F-score
SSH 92.3% 0.78
SMTP 85.2% 0.863
HTTPS 82.0% 0.791
classifier suffered only ∼10% compared to results from the cross-validation experi-
ment. We show the detailed results from this test in Table 3.4 (overall accuracy 80.1%).
We also noted that the network conditions in our test traces are considerably different
(CAIDA: recent inter-ISP, UNC: university border link from 6 years ago, and LANL:
recent border link to a large research institution). Thus, the classifier still performs cor-
rectly in this generic test the vast majority of the time, even with considerable network
differences exhibited in the traces.
3.2 Security Results
In this section we evaluate the realism of TrafficMimic using the classifier described
above. We use two attack scenarios to evaluate our cover traffic. The first is a generic
protocol classification attack and the second is specifically designed to detect Traf-
ficMimic.
3.2.1 Protocol Classification Attack
We first evaluate the realism of TrafficMimic using a generic protocol identification
attack. The goal of the attacker is to identify the underlying protocol running over
or using encrypted transport. As described before, this type of attack is the first step
for an attacker to target specific users or applications. Indeed, it can be considered
a precursor to more valuable attacks like website fingerprinting or real time session
keystroke attacks.
To construct the experiment, we use Swing to generate traffic parameters for HTTPS,
SMTP, and SSH protocols learned from the Feb CAIDA 2009 and UNC April 29, 2003
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Figure 3.2: Classification attack results for generated cover traffic
traces as described in Section 2.1. For comparison to these realistic protocols models,
we also use TrafficMimic to generate constant-rate cover traffic. TrafficMimic sends a
full size packet (1448 bytes) every 500ms. The slave TrafficMimic client echoes back
the same size packet upon receiving a packet from the master. Ten such exchanges
occur per connection before a new connection starts. This constant-rate model is a
trade-off between interactivity, bandwidth, and overhead. In future work we plan to
also evaluate randomized traffic models. We take the generated cover traffic and apply
the classifier using the training data from a different time period of traffic (Jan CAIDA
and April 20).
When using TrafficMimic, we were able to fool our classifier approximately 73% of
the time for the three realistic protocols we generated (Figure 3.2). Thus, on average,
our generated protocols are properly detected as real protocols at 91% of the rate that
real protocols are. This is well within the error range for our classifier in the general
attack scenario described above and is unlikely to lead to reliable defense detection.
We also extend our classification attack to support a simple anomaly detection algo-
rithm as follows. During training, we find the maximum distance of any training point
in each class from the centroid of the class (e.g., mk where k enumerates the classes
in the training set). During the application phase, we consider any test example whose
distance, di, to its nearest neighbor is greater than the maximum distance observed dur-
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ing training to be an anomaly. We use the threshold t to control the degree to which test
examples are labeled unknown. Thus a test example is considered an unknown protocol
if: di > t ∗mk.
Illustrating the vulnerability to defense detection of constant-rate schemes, we found
that we were 77.1% accurate in detecting constant-rate traffic as anomalous (using the
max distance detector with t=1.1). We found that the distance threshold algorithm was
not able to differentiate SMTP and constant-rate traffic as well as it was for HTTPS,
SSH, and constant-rate. To solve this problem, we introduce another simple unsuper-
vised anomaly detector to be used for port 25 only. It uses the K-means algorithm to
cluster the data. It then uses a threshold algorithm to determine which clusters have
the lowest mean inter-cluster distance. Any clusters that have greater than the thresh-
old inter-cluster distance are considered anomalous. We found that this technique was
95%+ accurate at differentiating SMTP and constant-rate traffic.
3.2.2 TrafficMimic-Tailored Attack
We next test TrafficMimic’s ability resist a defense detection attack specifically de-
signed to identify TrafficMimic generated traffic. To conduct the attack, the attacker
constructs a binary classifier that is trained to differentiate real traffic of a given protocol
from TrafficMimic generated traffic mimicking the same protocol. Thus, the attacker
has access to TrafficMimic and may use it generate training data for the attack.
To create training data, the attacker first samples real traffic of protocol X from a
generic trace (in our case we use HTTPS from the February CAIDA trace data). Then
the attacker takes the same generic trace and trains TrafficMimic behavior models for
protocol X . The attacker then generates cover traffic using the X model over a moni-
tored network link (IL-CA). The attacker combines these two sets of training data in a
manner that preserves an equal base-rate (i.e., half real and half cover). The attacker
can now use this training data to differentiate fake and real traffic of protocol X using
the same protocol classification attack described in Section 3.2.1.
To evaluate the effectiveness of this attack we use TrafficMimic to generate a second
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set of traffic, which is then tested against the trained classifier. We use a distinct (but
generic) network trace to create behavior models for the defender (i.e., LANL traces).
Thus we do not allow the attacker to train on exactly the same trace as the defender.
We then test it over the MN-UK link because in the worst, but most realistic, scenario
the attacker does not have access to the same network link as the defender. We found
the attack to be no more effective than random guessing (49.4% accuracy).
3.3 Performance and Overhead Results
We next investigate the performance of TrafficMimic as it compares to a constant-
rate defense. We use two simple mechanisms to generate real traffic: an SSH-based
interactivity model and bulk transfer. While these traffic patterns do not reflect real
network usage, they provide insight into the performance and overhead properties of
TrafficMimic. We believe that the interdependencies between using a complex traffic
generator like Swing to both load the system with real traffic and generate cover traffic
to carry it would result in data that were difficult to interpret. We repeat each of the
experiments below at least 10 times.
3.3.1 Interactive Performance
To evaluate interactive traffic in a TrafficMimic tunnel, we use a traffic model inspired
by our prior work [52]. Instead of analytically modeling the distributions of packet
sizes and inter-packet times, we extract these features directly from SSH traces from
the January CAIDA data set. Since SSH includes both interactive uses (e.g., typing in
a terminal) and other non-interactive features (e.g., file transfer or X forwarding), we
focus on extracting only the features resulting from a user typing into an SSH console.
In a standard SSH connection, each user key press generates an encrypted packet to
the server. The server immediately responds with another encrypted packet that con-
tains the character to be displayed on the user’s terminal. Since these key-press/response
packets require only a few bytes to transmit, the packets sent over the wire are the
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Figure 3.3: Overhead of generated protocols carrying interactive traffic on MN-UK link
minimum size for the encryption and MAC algorithm chosen by SSH (28-52 bytes de-
pending on algorithm). We searched for exchanges of packets in SSH connections that
used one of the possible minimum packet sizes for both the key-press and key-response
packets. We compute the latency between these key exchanges to find the user think
time between key presses.
We created a simple echo utility that randomly samples the interactive SSH data we
extracted and emits appropriately sized packets with the timing from the trace. We
then connect this utility to TrafficMimic with various generated cover traffic models.
In addition to using the constant rate model described above (Const1), we also created
a second constant-rate model that had a faster inter-packet time (Const2). We ran the
echo utility without TrafficMimic to find the mean latency of the network link (native).
We show the results of this experiment using the MN-UK link in Figure 3.3. We found
that we were able to achieve a mean delay comparable to the constant-rate schemes with
only a moderate increase in excess bytes. Surprisingly, protocols that inherently do not
seem to favor sustained interactivity such as SMTP and HTTPS both offer reasonable
delay compared to the constant-rate models.
While it was easy to improve the performance of the constant-rate model without
sacrificing overhead (Const2), realistic traffic patterns would make this tuning more
34
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
MN-UK IL-CA
Av
er
ag
e 
Ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
(kb
ps
) Constant
SMTP
HTTPS-req
HTTPS-resp
SSH
Figure 3.4: Bandwidth performance of generated protocols carrying bulk transfer traffic
difficult. For example, long periods of network silence would generate much higher
overhead with the faster acting constant-rate stream. In an empirical test of real user
Web browsing with Const1 and Const2 showed up to a 3.4x increase in overhead with-
out appreciable performance improvement. Furthermore, cover traffic tunnels, either
realistic or constant, still significantly impact mean interactive latency.
3.3.2 Bulk Transfer
To test the bandwidth of cover traffic tunneling we use Iperf [53] to generate a simple
one-way bulk transfer of a 100KB file. Since HTTPS is generally more asymmetric in
the number of bytes transferred from vs. to the server, we also perform the bulk transfer
from the slave to the master TrafficMimic node (HTTPS-resp). For the other protocols
and constant-rate models, we perform the bulk transfer from the master to the slave
node. Figure 3.4 shows the bandwidth in kbps for the entire bulk transfer on the wide
area test links. Figure 3.5 shows the ratio of the transmitted bytes to the original 100KB
test file size. This figure includes both directions of the cover traffic even though the
bulk transfer is only one-way.
The results show that we are able to achieve comparable or better bandwidth using
realistic protocol models as compared to the constant-rate model. The performance of
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HTTPS is especially good because the return path in the HTTP(S) protocol inherently
favors bulk transfer of files. The SSH traffic model showed much higher overhead. This
is primarily due to the asymmetry of SSH connections in how much flows from server
to client. Overall, realistic protocol models provide several options for performing
bulk transfer efficiently while not succumbing to the security problems associated with
defense detection. In Chapter 5, we investigate how to optimize the generation of
realistic cover traffic depending on the properties of the real flow and the needs of the
user.
3.3.3 Web Browsing
To illustrate some of the performance properties of TrafficMimic we use it with var-
ious traffic models to browse 5 common Internet sites. We retrieve the pages using
a tunnel on the MN-UK link. We use an OpenSSH tunnel to approximate the native
performance of proxying through these hosts. We show in Figure 3.6 the slowdown of
each protocol behavior model compared to the native proxy. The HTTPS traffic model
is better suited to carrying Web traffic than the generic constant-rate model. We also
found the SSH client model to be effective at transmitting Web traffic. We do not show
the results for SMTP because its performance carrying Web traffic was very poor (80-
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Figure 3.6: Web page load times using cover traffic models
150x slowdown). We believe this is due to the long sleep times that can occur in SMTP
that are mismatched with interleaved Web requests.
3.4 Conclusions
To evaluate TrafficMimic, we developed a new traffic classification algorithm based,
in part, on previous work in the area. We showed that the traffic models used in Traf-
ficMimic result in detection rates that are similar to those of real traffic and thus pro-
vide a good countermeasure for defense detection. We also evaluated the performance
of TrafficMimic for both interactive and bulk-transfer protocols and compared it with
constant-rate cover traffic models. Overall, we found that TrafficMimic offered reason-
able performance; in a later chapter of this work, we investigate how to parameterize
traffic generation models to better fit the real traffic being tunneled, and the effect this
has on both performance and security.
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CHAPTER 4
UNDERSTANDING TRAFFICMIMIC
PERFORMANCE
We thus far presented the design and evaluation of independent realistic cover traffic
tunneling. We next turn to simulation and analytic modeling to more deeply under-
stand the performance properties of our approach. In this chapter1, we investigate what
effect realistic cover traffic tunneling has on the real traffic being sent. Specifically,
what happens when the cover traffic and real traffic differ greatly in rate, and in the
fundamental carry size? Under what conditions would the latency of the real traffic be
significantly affected by various cover traffic? Under what conditions can we ensure
that the throughput of the real traffic is not affected by tunneling?
We developed a simulation model of this type of scenario using SSFNet [18]. The
model has detail with respect to protocols running on the hosts, but is simple in its
representation of the network. This chapter describes the model, and results analyzing
the effects of tunneling. It then develops an analytic model, which assumes tunneling
is carried out on a per-session basis. The model captures tunneling of both the request,
and the response elements of the traffic in a manner similar to the HTTP protocol. The
model characterizes performance as a function of traffic characteristics, and validates
the model’s predictions against measurements observed in the simulator. Using the
validated model, we determine conditions under which real traffic throughput is not
impacted by tunneling (although latency will always be impacted), and quantitatively
evaluate the impact on real traffic latency (e.g., “slowdown”) that tunneling imposes.
We develop a Markov chain model of this system, use it to determine conditions under
1Material from this chapter has, in part, appeared before in SIMULATION: Transactions of The So-
ciety for Modeling and Simulation International [54]. This chapter is also based, in part, on materials
in Proceedings of the 2008 Conference on Principles of Advanced and Distributed Simulation [55]. The
authors retain partial copyright and approve the use of the previously published materials in this disser-
tation. David M. Nicol contributed to the data, analysis, figures, and tables in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
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which real traffic throughput is not affected, and use it to quantitatively explore how
real traffic latency is affect by tunneling.
4.1 Simulation
To develop a tractable simulation model for TrafficMimic, we model all cover and real
traffic as request/response pairs. Each request/response pair is a single flow. This model
captures the behavior of many protocols and provides a consistent means to specify both
model and real traffic. The size of requests and responses can be read from a trace file,
or be generated randomly from given probability distributions.
In the simulator, we consider there to be two peer hosts within the system which
generate cover traffic to mask the real traffic they are transmitting to each other. We
assume that the attacker only has access to the network on which the real traffic is
obscured by the cover traffic. If this system is used as a proxy service, we do not protect
the real traffic from analysis before it is received and tunneled by one of the proxy end-
points. For simplicity in this simulation we assume that both the cover traffic and real
traffic originate on the same host.
We use similar terminology for the components of the simulation model as we do
for the implementation of TrafficMimic as described in Section 2.2. The tm-client is
the host that originates the cover connection and issues the request. The cover traffic
tm-server sends a response to the client after receiving its cover request. As we are
interested in impacts on real traffic that are much larger in magnitude than network
latencies, we need not (and do not) model the communication network between host
and client with any significant detail. Furthermore, we will see that the traffic itself has
high variance, which implies that the behavior already has significant effects we would
expect to see using a more detailed network model.
The core simulation loop continually plays back the cover traffic flows over simu-
lated TCP connections. A cover traffic flow has the following steps:
1. tm-client issues a cover request to the tm-server
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Figure 4.1: Example of interaction between cover and real flows
2. tm-server sends a cover response back to the client
3. tm-client pauses for randomly distributed inter-cover flow time and then repeats.
The sizes of the request and response may vary from session to session. We obtain
baseline performance of the real traffic by using these cover traffic flows. We time-
stamp each request and response at creation to calculate its delay. Later we can compare
the baseline delay against the performance of the same traffic embedded in a tunnel.
While the simulator is generating cover flows, it also sends available real traffic over
the tunnel. Similarly to TrafficMimic, either the tm-client or tm-server may be the
originator for the real traffic. The real traffic client host is called the master and the
server is called the slave. The master generates a real request (we will call A) for a
certain number of bytes to be sent after a random amount of time into the simulation.
Since the simulator is already sending cover traffic from the start of the simulation,
this will ensure that A will begin either during or between existing cover flows. We
mark A with its creation time-stamp, so that when it is delivered we can compute the
total delay. The simulator queues A until the cover flow next transmits data. A can be
embedded in either a request or response of the cover traffic. The system uses the size
of the cover traffic transmission to consume the correct number of bytes from A. This
process continues until A is fully sent (potentially across multiple distinct cover flows).
There may be additional cover flow padding to be transmitted if the remaining data in
A is smaller than the final cover message that carries it. Once the slave receives A, it
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generates and sends a response, B in a similar fashion. At the end of the simulation, the
master and slave each report the throughput and delay of A and B.
We illustrate an example of this process in Figure 4.1. We represent the cover session
as a series of flows with a real session above them in the diagram. The cover session is
inactive when the real request arrives, so it waits for the cover session to begin again.
The real response is split across three cover flows and takes considerably longer to
transmit than the real request. The real flow completes before the last cover flow that
carries it because the real data to be transmitted is smaller than the final cover response
that carries it.
Figure 4.1 also introduces several delay metrics we use to describe the performance
of cover and real flows. We use the term transmission delay to describe the time it
takes to transmit a request or response of X bytes. This delay starts when the request
or response is created and ends when it is fully received by the other end-point of the
connection. Cover transmission delay represents only the time required to transmit X
bytes across the network using TCP. Real transmission delay may span several cover
flows, therefore may also include TCP connection setup/tear-down and inter-cover ses-
sion times. We call the time required to complete both the request and response of a
single flow the total delay. Again, real total delay may span several cover flows and
may include time that is not directly due to transmitting data across the network.
4.1.1 Implementation
We created the system model described above using SSFNet [18]. The model contains
two protocol hosts which use blocking sockets running TCP. We adapted the standard
blocking socket TCP server and client to play back cover flows automatically, and
also play back generated model traffic if so specified in the model configuration file.
We specify distributions and moments or empirical CDFs for request and response
sizes which the server and client will use. The inter-cover flow time is drawn from an
exponential distribution with mean 200ms.
The entity representing the tm-client communicates certain information to the entity
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representing the tm-server to govern the generation of the simulated message sizes.
The tm-client entity specifies the sending time, the size of the request, the size of the
response, the type of the message, and the number of bytes from the real traffic to
be tunneled. Given that our TrafficMimic implementation imposes minimal overhead
from its forwarding and fragmentation protocol, our simulator models an ideal tunnel
implementation where space consumed by this per-message overhead does not reduce
the amount of space available in a cover message for real traffic. Data sizes of the
request and the response are sampled from empirical probability distributions based on
real observations.
Both tm-client and tm-server use timers to implement the start of the real traffic.
When fired, the timer’s callback code generates either a request or a response, as ap-
propriate. Since each simulation will only show the effect of a single real flow, the
model needs only to record the aggregate amount of requested traffic to send, and the
aggregate amount of traffic that has been received. This captures the queued real mes-
sage’s time waiting for enough tunnel traffic to be communicated.
Each message also has a state code, which specifies the connection state (new, empty,
and continue). The empty state simply tells the server to ignore the message because
no real traffic needs to be transmitted. This cover flow is entirely padding. The new
state instructs the slave that a new real flow is starting and gives the parameters for
its behavior. The continue state encodes the number of real bytes sent in an existing
real flow. Both master and slave keep track of the number of bytes remaining to be
received on a real flow. When receiving part of a real message, the slave determines
whether the message is a request or a response by a flag in the message called initiator.
It then decrements the local state of how many bytes remain to finish the message.
If the message has been completed, it will print a report on the overall throughput of
the system and then generate a response. Minor bookkeeping is needed to support
computation of real traffic bandwidth and latency.
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4.1.2 Generating Realistic Traffic
In this study, we focus on the behavior of HTTP traffic because it is the dominant
protocol used on the Internet today. Furthermore its encrypted equivalent, HTTPS, is
the most widely used encrypted protocol. We consider the specific behaviors of HTTP
since the TLS tunnel used by HTTPS does not change the observable patterns of the
protocol2. As stated, the typical pattern for HTTP is a small request followed by a
larger response. While this does not capture the full spectrum of what HTTP can do, it
provides a structure for the most common use of the protocol.
To determine the size distributions for requests and responses, we collected data from
real network traces. We assumed that all traffic on port 80 was HTTP. Since we did not
have access to packet payloads, we were unable to validate this assumption. After per-
forming appropriate TCP stream reassembly, we used several heuristics to differentiate
requests and response from a live network trace. All bytes sent to port 80 were requests
and bytes from port 80 were responses. Since requests and especially responses can
be split across many individual IP packets, we coalesce the packets together. All non-
zero length payloads sent in one direction without a non-zero length payload sent in the
other direction are coalesced together as one. This allows for the TCP stack to transmit
acknowledgments without arbitrarily splitting objects. Due to network reordering and
congestion, this heuristic may incorrectly classify request and responses. However, we
assume this to be rare enough to not skew the response size distributions considerably.
We used the above methods to analyze two hour-long traces collected by the Uni-
versity of North Carolina campus-wide border link in April 2003 [49]. While the data
from these two traces are similar, we use the data from one trace to generate cover traf-
fic and the other trace for real traffic. This allows us to keep the cover and real traffic
independent since we randomly sample real observations from the traces to generate
responses sizes.
To find the distribution of request sizes, we eliminated large outliers in the data.
These larger requests were likely HTTP POST commands, which contained a variable
2We ignore the behavior of TLS itself in this analysis; specifically, session start-up, key exchange,
and session tear-down.
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length payload. Even after removing large outliers, we retained over 90% of the data in
both traces. We observed that the request sizes were Gaussian and verified this using the
Shapiro-Wilk normality test. The mean request size from these traces, approximately
400 bytes, also matched intuition based on the number and length of HTTP headers
used by common Web browsers.
We found the distribution for response sizes to be more complicated. Prior work has
estimated that responses are a mix of a log-normal distribution and a long-tailed distri-
bution such as Pareto [39]. In the traces we analyzed, we observed significant variation
in response sizes, so we chose to use empirical distributions rather than fitting a known
distribution. Since some types of HTTP responses only include headers (e.g., for cache
control), we focused on the upper quartile of the response data (greater than ∼4KB).
This ensured that we were capturing actual Web content rather than HTTP headers or
XMLHttpRequests generated by AJAX. We also excluded very large responses (greater
than 1MB) as they likely represented file downloads rather than Web page browsing.
The large files we excluded represented less than 1% of the data.
Intuitively, response sizes vary greatly depending on the nature of the content being
browsed. For example, browsing a text-only web page will exhibit significantly differ-
ent object sizes than viewing a page with high-resolution images or videos. We used
K-means clustering to identify three different categories and respective empirical dis-
tributions. We call the categories low, medium, and high with respect to the magnitude
of their center points. While the distinction between these categories is purely arbitrary,
they establish some reasonable classes of response sizes to evaluate disparities between
different traffic types. Thus, we can evaluate the performance resulting from different
mixtures of these categories for the cover and real traffic. We give descriptions of the
clusters from both traces we analyzed in Table 4.1.
4.1.3 Results
Our simulation evaluation uses a simple network that connects two routers with a 50ms
delay and 100Mbits/s bandwidth link; each router has one attached host (client, and
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Table 4.1: Response size distribution clusters from UNC Web traffic traces
(a) Real traffic–collected April 20, 2003
Center Count Min Max
low 15206 395972 3779 76440
med 137702 25592 76458 378673
high 619700 2761 378798 1048352
(b) Cover traffic–collected April 29, 2003
Center Count Min Max
low 15441 437974 4250 100808
med 186254 14112 100849 432750
high 679303 2889 432826 1048463
server); host to router links have 20ms delay and 1.5Mbits/s bandwidth (Figure 4.2).
While simple, this network provides a useful baseline to quantify the effects of tunnel-
ing on a normal Internet user.
1.5 Mbits/s
20ms delay
1.5 Mbits/s
20ms delay
100 Mbits/s
50ms delay
Client Server
Figure 4.2: Simulated network configuration.
We evaluated the performance of cover sessions with the parameters from the three
response size categories on the network configuration specified above to establish a
baseline for TCP performance on our network. We show the results for transmission
throughput in Table 4.2. This data is computed by averaging the results of many exper-
iments. Each experiment randomly chooses a size sample from the empirical distribu-
tion associated with its type, then measures the time needed transmit the data (e.g., the
transmission delay). Data size divided by the measured transmission delay gives one
throughput sample. Table 4.2 gives the sample means and standard deviations from
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Table 4.2: Baseline transmission throughput (bytes/sec)
request low medium high
mean 4243 21453 99643 148963
std dev 1449 11613 17138 6468
Table 4.3: Total delay (seconds) on a real session tunneled over HTTP cover traffic
Traffic Types Mean Total Delay Std Dev
low/low 2.899 1.683
low/medium 3.394 1.767
low/high 6.399 3.621
medium/low 12.666 5.716
medium/medium 4.647 1.948
medium/high 7.327 3.658
high/low 53.053 16.486
high/medium 11.179 3.165
high/high 10.299 3.809
these experiments. Despite the large variation, we based the statistics on so many sam-
ples that the width of the 95% confidence interval is very small (less than 1% of the
mean).
These values capture the impact that the TCP protocol has on transfer rates—the
larger the segment sent, the lower the per-byte cost is. Our analytic model will use
these baseline measurements to account for size-dependent throughput.
To evaluate the effects of tunneling, we layered one traffic model on top of another.
To denote each tunnel test, we specify a traffic model that runs the real traffic first
followed by a slash and then the cover traffic model. For example, we call a test running
medium load real traffic over low load cover traffic: medium/low. The metric of interest
is total delay of a real flow—the difference between when a real flow’s request is ready
to be carried, and when the last byte of the real flow’s response is delivered.
We performed simulation experiments to assess the effects of tunneling real traffic
running HTTP over a tunnel that also uses HTTP. Table 4.3 gives the sample mean
and standard deviation of the total delay associated with serving that request and its
corresponding response, as a function of the real and cover traffic types. We will use
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Figure 4.3: “Response Throughput” of HTTP traffic tunneled over HTTP cover traffic
data in this table as the basis for comparison with an analytic model that predicts total
delay. Figure 4.3 shows a different metric associated with these same experiments, the
mean “response throughput”, where each sample measures the total number of bytes
delivered by the response only, divided by the total delay from arrival of the real traffic
request to the time when the last byte of the response is delivered. The idea is to focus
attention on the essential payload of the transaction, and treat the transmission of the
HTTP request as part of the set-up overhead, and not part of the delivered data. Each
real traffic type is shown by a series on the graph and the cover traffic type is indicated
on the x-axis. The error bars denote the 95% confidence interval around the sample
mean. The “none” category is the response throughput of the native traffic type, i.e.,
when the cover flow is not used. Each data point corresponding to a cover flow is
marked with the size of the corresponding throughput response, relative to the native
relative throughput.
We found that for low and high load real traffic, response throughput increases mono-
tonically with increasing bandwidth cover models. The sole exception to this trend is
the data point where medium load real traffic is carried by heavy load cover traffic.
The way to understand why the trend need not be uniform across all traffic types is
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the realization that with increasing cover bandwidth there comes both the performance
enhancing aspect of greater transmission efficiencies due to longer response transmis-
sions, but at the same time longer average wait times by the real traffic waiting for the
current cover session to end before its own request is served. The data otherwise con-
firms intuition; that low bandwidth cover traffic severely impacts performance (heavy
load real traffic gets only 8% of native response throughput, and even low load real
traffic gets only 29%); on the other hand, with heavy load cover traffic the performance
is (very approximately) half that of the native traffic for two of the traffic types, and a
quarter for the other. We improved the performance results compared to our previous
results [55] by delivering real data as soon as it is received rather than waiting for the
cover session, which carries the data to complete. We later apply this enhancement to
the TrafficMimic implementation in Chapter 5.
Overall, we observe substantial decreases in performance due to tunneling, with
some sensitivity to the cover traffic type. This indicates a need to carefully choose
the cover traffic model to fit the needs of the real traffic.
4.2 Analytic Model
A simple analytic model allows us to explore the inter-relationships between model
parameters and how the characteristics of the cover flow and real flow interact to affect
the performance of the real flow when tunneled. We develop the model, validate it,
and use it to derive bounds on the performance of tunneled traffic, and to describe
constraints on the cover flow that are necessary to ensure that the real traffic when
tunneled is not delayed beyond its natural arrival rate.
4.2.1 Model Details
We suppose that the data sizes of both cover flow and real flow sessions are measured
in a common unit, bytes, and that with respect to these units, the size of a session is a
random number of units. We assume that the distribution of an HTTP request size is
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the same for both cover and real flows, and denote that variable as Greq. The size of
an HTTP response for the cover flow is G(c)rsp, and the size of an HTTP response for the
real flow is G(r)rsp. The time required to transmit a byte of a HTTP request is denoted
τreq, while the time required to transmit a response byte of the cover flow is denoted τc,
and the corresponding time for a real flow’s response byte sent without tunneling is τr.
These constants incorporate all the effects of the network on packet transmission, e.g.,
TCP congestion control, packet loss, and link bandwidths. We distinguish between τreq
and τc because the length of the messages sent may be different, and so the average
cost-per-byte will be different due to TCP congestion control.
Tunneled real flow performance depends in part on the delays between cover ses-
sions, which we assume are random, independent, and exponentially distributed, de-
noted I. The mean cover flow inter-session delay is E[I] = µc.
We can view the process of a cover flow as an alternating “on-off” renewal pro-
cess [56], where the off time is exponential with mean µc, and the on time has the
distribution of Tc = (τreqGreq+ τcG
(c)
rsp). We introduce the notation of Tc for simplicity
of expression needed later, and note that
E[Tc] = τreqE[Greq]+ τcE[G
(c)
rsp]
and
E[T 2c ] = τ
2
reqE[G
2
req]+2τreqτcE[Greq]E[G
(c)
rsp]+ τ2c E[(G
(c)
rsp)
2].
The total delay associated with a real session has three components. The first is the
waiting time between when the real session arrives to be served, and when the next
cover session starts by carrying some (or all) of the real session’s HTTP request in a
cover HTTP request, we call this random time Rwait . On the time-line of Figure 4.1
Rwait is the interval between instant (a) and instant (b). The second component starts
where the first left off, and ends at the instant where the first cover response begins
to carry the real response; we call this Rreq. On the time-line of Figure 4.1 this is
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equal to the interval from instant (b) to (c). The final component picks up there, and
ends when the last byte of the real response is received; we call this delay Rrsp—on
the example the gap from (c) to (d). The mean total delay for the real session is
E[Rwait ]+E[Rreq]+E[Rrsp]. We now consider each of these terms.
If the real session arrives while the cover session is busy, then it waits for the cover
session to end, and then waits for a full inter-session delay to pass. If the real session
arrives while the cover session is idle, then it waits only for the remaining inter-session
delay. But since that delay is exponentially distributed, the residual delay is as well.
In either case Rwait contains an exponentially distributed intersession delay. Under our
assumptions, the cover session has run to “equilibrium” by the time the real traffic
request arrives, then by renewal theory [56] the probability of the cover session being
busy when the real session arrives is the ratio of its mean on time to the sum of the
mean on and mean off times. If the request arrives when the cover session is busy, the
mean time until the cover session ends is the “mean excess life” [56] of the random
variable Tc (defined above), known to be E[T 2c ]/(2E[Tc]), which, applied to our model,
enables us to write
E[Rwait ] = µc+
(
E[Tc]
E[Tc]+µc
)(
E[T 2c ]
2E[Tc]
)
. (4.1)
The expression of E[Rreq] is conceptually more complex. Depending on the size of
the HTTP request presented by the real flow, it may require multiple full cover sessions
to carry the real HTTP request embedded in the cover HTTP requests. Denote this
random variable by Creq; in Figure 4.1 it happens that Creq = 0 because the real request
is entirely carried in the first cover session request. The distribution of Creq is defined
in terms of the distributions of the sizes of the real and cover HTTP request blocks.
For simplicity of expression (and based on empirical observation) we assume that the
real and cover request block sizes are independent and identically distributed. If we
then define a sequence of i.i.d. samples of Greq as Greq,0,Greq,1,Greq,2, . . ., then the
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distribution of Creq is seen to be given by
Pr{Creq < n} = Pr{
n
∑
i=1
Greq,i < Greq,0}
= Pr{0 < Greq,0−
n
∑
i=1
Greq,i} (4.2)
While this expression is slightly daunting in the general case, we observe that under the
assumption (verified empirically) that Greq has a Gaussian distribution, then the sum
Greq,0−∑ni=1 Greq,i is Gaussian, with mean (1− n)E[Greq] and variance nVar(Greq).
Therefore, given empirically determined estimates of E[Greq] and Var(Greq) we can
easily compute the distribution of Creq.
We can express the mean value of Rreq as
E[Rreq] = E[
Creq
∑
i=1
(I+Tc)]+ τreqE[Greq],
recalling that I is the random inter-session delay for the cover traffic. This expression
recognizes that Rreq is comprised of Creq full cover sessions and inter-session delays
(because the real request block is not yet fully carried), followed by one final cover re-
quest (that carries the last piece of the real request). Now Creq is technically a “stopping
time” [56], so that Wald’s Lemma allows us to simplify the above as
E[Rreq] = E[Creq](µc+E[Tc])+ τreqE[Greq]. (4.3)
Finally, the derivation of E[Rrsp] follows the logic of E[Rreq]: a random number of
full cover session cycles are needed to carry real response bytes, but on the last session
the final segment of response bytes are carried. We denote the random number of
full cover sessions needed by Crsp; in the example of Figure 4.1 we have Crsp = 2.
Following the same logic as before observe that the distribution of Crsp is given by
Pr{Crsp < n}= Pr{0 < G(r)rsp−
n
∑
i=1
G(c)rsp,i}
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where {G(c)rsp,i}, i = 1,2,3, . . . is an i.i.d. sequence of instances of cover response block
sizes G(c)rsp. We can segregate the time spent carrying real response traffic into the time
spent in actual transmission, and time spent in the other phases of the cover session that
are not directly carrying real response traffic. The mean time spent actually transmitting
real response bytes is just τcE[G
(r)
rsp]. Here it is important to recognize that the per-byte
transmission cost is that of the cover flow, not that of the native real flow. The extra
time in the cover session is comprised of a sum of Crsp instances of cover inter-session
and cover request transmission times. Crsp is a stopping time with computable mean,
just as Creq was, which brings us to the expression
E[Rrsp] = E[Crsp]
(
µc+ τreqE[Greq]
)
+ τcE[G
(r)
rsp]. (4.4)
Using equations 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4 we have an expression for the mean delay a real
session has under the tunneling scheme:
E[Dreal] = E[Rwait ]+E[Rreq]+E[Rrsp]. (4.5)
While the expression is exact, it is important to know that in practical application some
approximations will be needed. The exact distributions of Crsp and Creq depend on the
exact distributions of Greq, G
(r)
rsp, and G
(c)
rsp. We have good reason to model Greq as hav-
ing a Gaussian distribution. We know that G(c)rsp and G
(r)
rsp emphatically do not. When
known, the distributions of Crsp and Creq might be computed to whatever accuracy
that is needed. Still, in the validation study we consider next, we use the empirically
observed mean and variance of those sizes, and assume that the distributions are Gaus-
sian. This greatly simplifies the computation of the distributions of Crsp and Creq, and
hence computation of their mean values.
4.2.2 Validation
Before we use the analytic model to explore system behavior, we consider first how
well it describes the simulation data we have collected already.
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Section 4.1.2 describes how we gathered request and response data sizes from real
traffic, and from these categorized each HTTP response as being in a “low”, “medium”,
or “high” load category. We observed that request data sizes were well described by
Gaussian distributions, but that the response data sizes were not. Table 4.1 gives the
mean and standard deviation of the measured response data sizes, and Table 4.3 gives
the simulation results estimating a real session’s mean delay, as a function of the cover
and real traffic type. It is important to note that the simulation sampled the response
sizes from the empirical distribution based on a real network trace. Specifically, every
time the simulation sampled a response size, it chose one of the empirically observed
session response sizes uniformly at random.
Equation 4.5 expresses our analytic expression for mean delay, in terms given by
equations 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4. The latter two depend on values of E[Creq] and E[Crsp],
which in turn depend on the distribution of the real and cover response sizes. To sim-
plify these calculations we will assume that the response size distributions are Gaussian,
even though the empirical distributions fail standard statistical tests for the Gaussian.
Under this approximation we can compute the mean delays predicted by our model,
and compute the relative error: (dpred− dobs)/dobs, where dpred is the delay predicted
by the model and dobs is the mean delay observed by the simulation. Table 4.4 gives
the relative error as a function of the real and cover traffic types, where, as before, we
characterize an experiment in terms of the real traffic type, followed by ’/’ and then the
cover traffic type. It also gives a standard measure of the quality of a simulation based
estimate, also called relative error, equal to the width of the confidence interval divided
by the sample mean.
Despite the approximations of E[Creq] and E[Crsp], the analytic model predictions
match very well with the simulation measurements. 7% absolute error is the largest
magnitude observed, and is only slightly larger than the simulation’s own relative error.
We believe the “high” load real traffic experiments have the best accuracy because the
delay time is dominated by transmission of real response data (in both predicted and
measured forms), which our model very accurately captures, and which leads to much
smaller variation in the simulation. When the real traffic load is “low” there is a much
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Table 4.4: Relative error of analytic model predictions of mean real session delay, and
simulation-based estimates
Relative Error
Traffic Types Model Simulation
low/low 0.053 0.051
low/medium -0.067 0.045
low/high -0.068 0.049
medium/low 0.041 0.039
medium/medium 0.001 0.036
medium/high -0.073 0.043
high/low 0.003 0.027
high/medium 0.008 0.025
high/high 0.007 0.032
larger contribution to delay in the Rwait and Rreq components, and there is a larger
variation in the simulated values as well.
Having now strong confidence in the predictive power of our analytic model, we
now use it to better understand how characteristics of cover and real flows may affect
performance of the tunneled flow.
4.2.3 Lower Bound on Slowdown
Our first consideration is of the impact tunneling has on real traffic delay as a function
of the traffic characteristics. Under certain conditions on the cover traffic we can derive
a lower bound on slowdown—the degree by which the real traffic is delayed more under
tunneling than natively. Towards this end we identify a condition under which E[Dreal]
increases as µc increases.
Since E[Dreal] = E[Rwait ]+E[Rreq]+E[Rrsp] and each of these is a function of µc,
consider the derivative dE[Dreal]/dµx. Inspection of equations 4.3 and 4.4 show clearly
that dE[Rreq]/dµc > 0 and dE[Rrsp]/dµc > 0, so we ask under what conditions are we
assured that dE[Rwait ]/dµc > 0? Observe from equation 4.1 that
dE[Rwait ]
dµc
= 1−E[T 2c ](E[Tc]+µc)−2/2.
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A sufficient condition for this derivative to be non-negative is that
2(E[Tc]+µc)2 ≥ E[T 2c ].
which will certainly be satisfied if after we drop the µc term we still have
2(E[Tc])2 ≥ E[T 2c ].
Now E[T 2c ] = var(Tc)+(E[Tc])
2, so the condition above is satisfied if E[Tc]2≥ var(Tc).
This is essentially a bound on the variation of Tc that is met by a large class of prob-
ability distributions, loosely, ones whose variation is not larger than an exponential’s
(where the square of the mean is identically the variance). This observation leads us to
the first result
Lemma 1 If E[Tc]2 ≥ var(Tc), then E[Dreal] is a monotone increasing function of µc,
so that E[Dreal] is minimized when µc = 0.
One way of thinking about the impact that tunneling has on performance is to con-
sider the ratio of the mean delay of a real traffic session under tunneling to the mean
delay run natively. This is a measure of the relative increase in delay due to tunnel-
ing. Lemma 1 tells us the numerator is minimized (and so the slowdown is minimized)
when µc = 0. We reduce the numerator even further assuming E[Creq] = E[Crsp] = 0.
Under these minimizing assumptions the slowdown is at least
E[T 2c ]/(2E[Tc])+ τreqE[Greq]+ τcE[G
(r)
rsp]
τreqE[Greq]+ τrE[G
(r)
rsp]
.
The delay τreqE[Greq] which appears in both the numerator and denominator is, in
large flows of interest, small relative to τcE[G
(r)
rsp] and τrE[G
(r)
rsp]. Another step towards
simplifying this ratio is to recognize that since Tc is the sum of τcG
(c)
rsp with a non-
negative random variable, the mean excess of τcG
(c)
rsp is necessarily smaller than the
mean excess of Tc. Thus, making that substitution reduces the ratio further. Under
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these substitutions then a lower bound on slowdown is
τ2c E[(G
(c)
rsp)
2]/(2τcE[G
(c)
rsp])+ τcE[G
(r)
rsp]
τrE[G
(r)
rsp]
=
(
τc
τr
)(
E[(G(c)rsp)2]
E[G(c)rsp]E[G
(r)
rsp]
+1
)
. (4.6)
This leads us to our result on a lower bound on slowdown.
Theorem 1 Suppose that E[Tc]2 ≥ var(Tc), and that τreqE[Greq] is negligible relative
to τcE[G
(r)
rsp] and τrE[G
(r)
rsp]. Then the ratio of the mean delay of a real session under
tunneling to the native mean delay is at least
(
τc
τr
)(
var(G(c)rsp)
E[G(c)rsp]E[G
(r)
rsp]
+1
)
+
τcE[G
(c)
rsp]
τrE[G
(r)
rsp]
.
Proof: We use the identity E[(G(c)rsp)2] = var(G
(c)
rsp) +E[G
(c)
rsp]
2 and equation 4.6 to
derive the result. 
The final expression for slowdown exposes a key relationship that impacts it. The ra-
tio τcE[G
(c)
rsp]/τrE[G
(r)
rsp] compares the time it takes to transmit a cover session response
with the time it takes to natively transmit a real session response. When the cover traf-
fic and real traffic types are identical this ratio is one, τc = τr, and so the slowdown
is at least two. When the cover session response is significantly larger than the real
session response then we expect τc < τr, and this slowdown bound is at least the degree
to which it takes longer to transmit a cover session response than it does a real session
response (natively). When the cover session response is significantly smaller than the
real session response then we expect τc > τr, and slowdown is at least τc/τr.
When considering the implications of these equations, it is important to remember
that they are predicated on the assumption that τreqGreq is comparatively negligible. For
example, in Figure 4.3 we have τreqGreq being approximately 50% percent of τrG
(r)
rsp,
so it cannot be viewed as negligible. Still, these simple bounds expressions help to
explain the data points associated with the real session under heavier load.
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4.3 Markov Chain Model
The dynamics of additional delay suffered by a real session are complex. The for-
mulation shown already is able to express the mean delay a real session suffers, but
expresses only that mean. For any deeper understanding of what is going on we need
a different model. By making some simplifying assumptions we are able to describe
dynamics using the theory of Markov chains. Towards this end we ignore the HTTP
request phase for both real and cover sessions, and so model the “on” phase as that
carrying the HTTP response, with the “off” phase being the (exponential) inter-session
delay with mean µc. Unlike the earlier analysis, here we consider the real traffic to
itself be an on-off process, with exponential off-time having mean µr.
We assume the number of bytes sent in a cover session “on” phase is geometrically
distributed, so that the time spent in the on phase is a constant times a geometric random
variable. We assume that µc and µr are expressed in units where that constant is 1. We
suppose that the mean number of bytes transmitted during a cover session on period
has mean 1/pc, and that the mean number of bytes required by a real session has mean
1/pr.
Under these assumptions we can model and analyze system dynamics formally using
the theory of Markov chains. The state of the cover process is always off (0) or on (1).
The state of the real process is either off (0), waiting for a cover session to carry more
real traffic (1), or being carried by the cover session (2). There are six interesting
system states denoted by a tuple of these two state descriptions. On entry to any one of
them, the memoryless properties of the exponential and geometric distributions make
the future behavior of the system entirely dependent on the state entered. The time
within a state need not be exponential though, so the continuous time process is not
a standard continuous time Markov chain. However, the system we describe has an
embedded discrete-time Markov chain from which we will be able to derive the steady-
state state occupancy probabilities of the continuous time stochastic process.
We now describe each state, its outbound transition probabilities, and the mean time
the system stays in that state (which is needed for the steady-state probabilities). A
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Pr{ G(pc)< Exp(μr) }
1
1
1
(1/μr)/
(1/μr+1/μc)
1-(1/μr)/
(1/μr+1/μc)
(0,0)
1/(1/μr+1/μc)
(1,0)
E[ min{G
(pc),Exp(μr)} ]
(0,1)
μc
(1,2)
1/pe
(0,2)
μc
(1,1)
1/pc
Pr{ G(pc) ≥ Exp(μr) }
pc(1-pr)/pe
pcpr/pe
pc(1-pr)/pe
Figure 4.4: Discrete-time Markov chain for session model
diagram of this chain is also shown in Figure 4.4. We denote states as ovals with
transition probabilities labeling the arrows. We give the mean waiting time inside each
state oval along with its tuple state label (x,y).
(0,0) : Both processes are off, which means that the state changes when the first of the
waiting times completes. Since the waiting times are exponential, the probability
of transitioning to (0,1) (i.e., the real session arrives first) is (1/µr)/(1/µr +
1/µc). The probability of transitioning to (1,0) is the complement of this—no
other transitions from this state are possible. The mean holding time in this state
is the mean of the minimum of the two constituent exponentials, e.g., 1/(1/µr +
1/µc).
(0,1) : A real session has arrived and is waiting for the cover process to begin. When
it does, the system transitions to state (1,2)—that’s the only transition possible.
The mean time the system spends in this state once entered is µc.
(1,0) : The cover process starts at a time when the real process is off. From here one
of two things can happen. Either the cover process completes before the real pro-
cess starts (i.e., a transition to (0,0)), or a real session arrives to be carried while
the cover session is yet active. The transition probability into (0,0) is therefore
the probability that a geometric with success probability pc is less than an expo-
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nential with mean µr; the transition probability into (1,1) is its complement. The
mean time in this state is the mean of the minimum of independent geometric and
exponential random variables. These quantities can be computed numerically.
(1,1) : In this state the cover process is active while the real process is waiting. The
only transition from this state is to (0,1). The mean time in the state once entered
is 1/pc.
(1,2) : This is the only system state where real traffic is carried. The system stays in
this state until either the cover session ends, or the real session ends. At any given
step the probability that at least one of the two sessions ends given that neither
has yet is pe = 1− (1− pc)∗ (1− pr)—one minus the probability that they both
end. Transitions are possible into state (0,2) (with probability pc(1− pr)/pe ),
into state (1,0) (with probability pr(1− pc)/pe ), or state (0,0) (with probability
pc pr/pe).) The mean time in this state once entered is 1/pe.
(0,2) : This state is reached when a cover session ends before the real session it was
carrying completes. The only transition from here is back into state (1,2), which
occurs when the cover process enters the on state again. The mean time in this
state once entered is µc.
The values of the transition probability matrix P for this system are described above;
it is straightforward to numerically solve vector equation pi∗ = pi∗P to find the equilib-
rium state occupancy probabilities (in vector pi∗), e.g., using Gaussian elimination. By
the theory of generalized Markov processes [56], the equilibrium fraction of time the
system is in state S is given by piS = pi∗S mS/∑states T pi
∗
T mT , where mS is the mean time
in state S, once entered.
4.3.1 Stability
The session model we have explored has the characteristic of holding back real traffic in
one session so long as the traffic in the previous session is still being carried. As such,
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using tunneling could therefore reduce the rate at which real sessions are processed. We
aim to answer the following questions: what are the characteristics of the cover flow
that are necessary to “keep up” with a real flow, or alternatively, given a cover flow,
what real flows can use it to tunnel without having their inherent session throughput
adversely affected?
We approach the problem by thinking of the tunneling as a service, and the real
sessions to be tunneled as jobs to be served. We again ignore the HTTP request phase.
In this model we allow the “off” time of one cycle to coincide with the processing time
of a previous cycle. In other words, the waiting time between successive real session
transfers may be masked by the processing time of a prior transfer. Viewed this way
gives rise to a queueing system with one server, whose mean service time is E[Dreal].
The inter-arrival time between real sessions is the time between the beginnings of real
sessions when they are run natively. Continuing to use 1/pr to denote the mean number
of bytes in a real session response, and 1/pc to denote the mean number of bytes in a
cover session response, the mean of this inter-arrival time is τr/pr+µr, where µr is the
mean “down” time between successive delivered real sessions, run natively.
We know from the theory of G/G/1 queueing systems [56] that the queue is sta-
ble (i.e., has a limiting state occupancy distribution) when the service rate is strictly
greater than the mean inter-arrival time. We obtain the service rate from our Markov
chain model—the fraction of time the system is in state (1,2), times the cover session
throughput: pi(1,2)/τc. Stability is ensured when
pi(1,2)/τc >
1.0
τr/pr +µr
.
In the subsequent analysis of slowdown we use this bound to consider only model
parameter sets where the resulting system is stable.
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4.3.2 Slowdown
Vector pi from the Markov chain model encodes what we need to compute slowdown.
Consider: given that the system has a real session to carry, the rate at which that data
is carried is the fraction of time the system is in state (1,2), conditioned on there being
real traffic to carry, times 1/τc:
ψc = (1/τc)
pi(1,2)
(1−pi(0,0)−pi(1,0))
.
The native rate that real session traffic is carried, given that real traffic is available, is
1/τr. Given N packets to transmit (N large), the slowdown is
slowdown =
Nψc
N/τr
= (τr/τc)
( pi(1,2)
1−pi(0,0)−pi(1,0)
)
.
We now use this model to investigate how different model parameters affect slow-
down.
It is intuitive that slowdown will be impacted significantly by the availability of cover
traffic—more and more cover traffic yields smaller slowdowns. The experiments we
performed use cover traffic utilization as the independent variable. Another important
factor is the relative sizes of cover and real sessions. Figure 4.5 plots slowdown as
a function of cover traffic utilization, given a baseline native real utilization of 10%.
Experiments identical to these with increasing real utilization yield essentially identical
slowdowns. We plot slowdown for a variety of mixes of pr and pc. Three features of
this data stand out. The first is that slowdown is a convex decreasing function of cover
session utilization. When utilization is high there is a lot of traffic to be tunneled—
provided that the sizes of the real sessions are large relative to the cover sessions. For
even when cover utilization is high, a short real session will have to wait for a long
cover session to finish before the real session can start. This is seen in the second
feature of the data; for a given cover utilization, slowdown is an increasing function
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Figure 4.5: Slowdown as a function of cover traffic utilization when native real utiliza-
tion is 10%
pr/pc (e.g., the ratio of the mean cover session size to mean real session size). The
final interesting facet of the data is that even when pr/pc is advantageous, under low
cover utilization the slowdown can be quite large. This reflects the waiting time a real
session incurs for a cover session to come along and start to carry it.
The conclusions we can draw from this graph are that slowdown can be small—less
than 25%, say, provided that one is willing to dedicate a large portion of bandwidth to
the cover traffic relative to the real traffic, and that the cover sessions are short relative
to real traffic sessions. Deviation from these conditions brings one into the realm of
slowdowns that are a factor of 5 or more. One should note though that slowdown is
a measure of the impact on latency. The conditions studied here all ensure that the
tunneling does not impact the long-term rate of real traffic sessions.
4.3.3 Bandwidth
Next we consider bandwidth use. This is straightforward, appealing to the renewal
structure of the session models. We view transmitted kilobytes as a reward; the rate at
which this reward is earned is the mean consumed bandwidth. The theory of reward
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renewal processes says that if reward is earned at rate λ during an on cycle, and not
at all during an off cycle, then the limiting rate at which the process as a whole earns
reward is λE[on time]/(E[on time] +E[off time]). Applied to our models, the cover
session earns reward at rate 1/τc during the on cycle, and the real session earns it at
rate 1/τr during the on cycle. The overall rate reward values are thus
λc =
(
τc/pc
τc/pc+µc
)
1
τc
,
and
λr =
(
τr/pr
τr/pr +µr
)
1
τr
.
We have seen that the cover flow must be frequent enough to carry real flow without
affecting throughput. An informative metric to compute is the ratio λc/λr, giving us
the factor by which the cover traffic has more volume. We obtain
(λc/λr) = (pr/pc)
(
τr/pr +µr
τc/pc+µc
)
.
This has the intuitive interpretation as the factor by which the cover traffic carries more
packets during a session than does the real traffic, times the factor by which a native
on-off cycle of the real traffic is longer than a cover traffic session. For fixed pr, τr, and
τc this ratio increases as (1/pc) increases, e.g., as the length of the cover session grows.
4.4 Conclusions
Independent cover traffic tunneling can exact a considerable performance cost to the
real traffic being tunneled. In this chapter we investigate the properties of those perfor-
mance costs using simulation and analytic modeling. We use the simulation to gener-
ate measurements of traffic behavior, using high fidelity models of protocols that carry
traffic. We use the measurements to validate an analytic model of latency. We then
augment the model to capture the dynamics of tunneling sessions, in a Markov chain
formalism. From this model we can express conditions under which the real traffic
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throughput is unaffected by tunneling, and extract the slowdown—i.e., the factor by
which the latency is increased by tunneling.
The models aid us in determining constraints to follow that ensure that the real traf-
fic’s throughput, latency or stability are bounded. As intuition suggests, real traffic
slowdown is minimized when there is ample cover traffic to carry it. Similarly, real
bandwidth grows as the volume of cover traffic grows in relation to the real traffic vol-
ume. However, we found that mismatches between the relative sizes of cover and real
sessions can result in significant performance degradation. These mismatches can re-
sult from having a cover stream that is too small, and though its utilization is high, the
inter session time can drastically increase latency. When the cover stream is too large,
the real traffic has to wait for large empty cover streams to complete before real trans-
mission can begin. Even when the relative sizes are favorable, a cover session model
with low utilization can result in higher slowdowns. Thus, the waiting times that arise
from the combination of real and cover traffic have a greater impact on performance
than padding or native network transmission time.
We found that the nature of our problem allows for an interesting and useful de-
coupling of models. We show that it is possible to take measurements from real or
simulated traffic and use it to estimate parameters for an accurate analytic model of
tunneling, without the measurements or simulations having any notion at all of tunnel-
ing. Analysis of the analytic model shows that its predictions of slowdown are very
dependent on the accuracy of the ratios of the mean time to transmit a packet using
the cover session pattern, to the mean time to transmit it in the native real flow. The
analytic model is useful as an explanatory device without accurate measurements of
these means, but is questionable as a predictive device without them. Together these
different model forms can address analysis of tunneled traffic in a way that neither can
individually.
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CHAPTER 5
ENHANCING PERFORMANCE WITH
BIASED COVER TRAFFIC
Existing encrypted traffic analysis attacks rely on some sort of inference technique to
reconstruct information about the plaintext. Since these techniques have nonzero error
rates, we have the ability to relax our independence assumption for cover traffic tun-
neling to improve performance. We approach this problem by biasing the selection of
cover traffic parameters based on the current state of the real traffic. We treat the bi-
asing process as a per-parameter black-box function, which transforms the parameter’s
distribution into an optimized selection.
We investigate biasing through simulation and Internet study of various functions
we have developed using intuition from our previous simulation and analytic modeling
work in Chapter 4. We focus on biasing on object size parameters (request and response
sizes from Table 2.1).
The degree to which we can make cover traffic generation dependent on the real
traffic to improve performance is security-sensitive. In this chapter, we investigate the
following questions about biasing: How much does biasing aid reconstruction of the
plaintext by an attacker? What impact does biasing have on defense detection? With
knowledge of the expected protocol behavior of the real traffic, can a user optimally
select a cover traffic model? How does biasing improve the performance of the Traf-
ficMimic tests using an independent cover traffic model from Chapter 3?
5.1 Biasing
In the unoptimized system described in Chapter 2, TrafficMimic generates the stream
of cover traffic independently from the data actually being sent by the real flow. This
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ensures that an attacker is unable to recover information leaked by the cover traffic.
While secure, this scheme can produce poor performance when there is a mismatch
between the traffic properties of the real and cover traffic. In this section, we describe
methods for selecting cover traffic patterns with knowledge of the real traffic.
As described before, we collect empirical distributions of structural features learned
from a real network trace using Swing. TrafficMimic uses distributions of request
size, response size, inter-exchange time, and inter-connection time to generate cover
traffic. To sample these distributions to create cover traffic, we perform the empirical
equivalent of inverse transform sampling by converting uniform [0,1] variates to indices
into the sorted array that stores the empirical distribution.
The general approach to our performance improvements involves biasing the selec-
tion of the samples from the empirical distribution. Rather than directly sampling, we
call a function bias that takes the empirical distribution to sample, the state of the real
flow, and a parameter that controls amount of biasing to apply. The state parameter
describes the needs of the real flow for the traffic parameter described by the empir-
ical distribution. This state can either be the instantaneous current value of a traffic
property (e.g., the number of bytes of the real flow that are queued to be sent) or an
estimate of the current state from history (e.g., the exponential moving average of past
real inter-exchange times). This function returns a random sample from the empirical
distribution whose selection is influenced by the current state of the real flow.
In this chapter, we focus on creating and evaluating bias functions that operate on
the object size traffic properties (request or response sizes). TrafficMimic uses a local
per-flow buffer of 64KB (qmax) to store pending real data at both the tm-server and tm-
client. The bias functions use the amount of data in this pending buffer as their state
parameter. We use the variable q to denote the amount of data in this buffer.
From our work in Chapter 4, we observed that frequent object splitting and the extra
waiting it causes was the dominant reason for poor performance. We also found that
excessive overage impacted latency because large underutilized cover objects cause the
cover flow to stall sending padding when real data is waiting. We use these insights
to design bias functions that avoid splitting and minimize excess bytes. Though these
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assumptions may not be optimal1, for all protocols, we show that they can considerably
improve performance for many common protocols.
5.1.1 Functional Biasing
The first class of biasing techniques work by influencing the selection of samples from
the empirical distribution using a statistical distribution described by the probability
density function fb. fb is a piecewise continuous distribution2 that maps uniform [0,1]
to biased [0,1] given the cumulative fraction x0 of the current value of q. We find this
value by using the empirical observations of the CDF Fcov.
Fcov(q) = x0
We then randomly sample the distribution described by fb using inverse transform
sampling. This requires that we derived the inverse CDF F−1b of fb. We also need a
[0,1] uniform random variable y as input to this process. Thus, F−1b takes parameters y,
x0, and a set of parameters denoted by param.
F−1b (y,x0, param) = xs
Now we can select a biased sample c from the cover distribution using its inverse
CDF and a biased [0,1] random variate xs.
F−1cov (xs) = c
We next describe several candidate fb distributions that we will use to bias object
size distributions.
1Avoiding splitting and minimizing excess bytes may not be optimal, especially for protocols (e.g.,
VoIP) that differ considerably from our test set of SSH, SMTP, and HTTPS.
2Note that fb is continuous, even though fcov could be discrete. We assume that fb is continuous so
that it can be applied to any traffic parameter (i.e., one that is continuous, like interconnection time). We
utilize the natural binning that occurs with a sampled empirical distribution to convert between discrete
and continuous representations.
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Probability Split
We start with a simple bias distribution. It attempts to avoid object splitting by prefer-
entially selecting values greater than q with a fixed probability 1− p.
fb(x,x0, p) =

p
x0
0≤ x < x0
1−p
1−x0 x0 ≤ x≤ 1
We derive the CDF by integration:
∫ x
0
p
x0
dz =
px
x0
∫ x0
0
p
x0
dz+
∫ x
x0
1− p
1− x0 dz = p+
(
1− p
1− x0
)
(x− x0)
Fb(x,x0, p) =

px
x0
0≤ x < x0
p+
(
1−p
1−x0
)
(x− x0) x0 ≤ x≤ 1
and invert the CDF to yield F−1b
F−1b (y,x0, p) =

yx0
p 0≤ y < p
x0+
(y−p)(1−x0)
1−p p≤ y≤ 1
Since the bias functions that we develop have different parameter ranges, we develop
a standardized parameter α that increases bias as the parameter grows larger. In all
cases, we consider α = 0 to designate no biasing. For this probability distribution, we
consider α to be related to p as follows: p = 1/α. Figure 5.1(a) shows a sample of the
PDF of this function graphically where p = 0.25 (similarly α = 4).
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Figure 5.1: Sample PDFs of various bias functions with x0 = 0.6
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Linear Decay
The next distribution we describe features a uniform probability below x0 and then a
linear decay for x ≥ x0. The motivation for this function is to bias giving mass larger
than x0 while simultaneously limiting overhead. To construct a PDF for this distribution
we construct a piesewise function. The height of the distribution is h for x < x0. For
x0 ≥ x, we have a triangle with area 1− x0h. We can then find its height y0 (i.e., the
height of the optimal point x0). We then find the slope of the line forming the triangle
and its intercept.
fb(x,x0,h) =
h 0≤ x < x02(hx0−1)(x−1)
(x0−1)2 x0 ≤ x≤ 1
Fb(x,x0,h) =
hx 0≤ x < x01+(hx0−1) (x−1)2(x0−1)2 x0 ≤ x≤ 1
We can then use the inverse of the CDF to create biased samples from the cover size
distribution.
F−1b (y,x0,h) =

y
h 0≤ y < hx0
1+(x0−1)
√
(y−1)
(hx0−1) hx0 ≤ y≤ 1
Again we use parameter α , where h = 1/α. Figure 5.1(b) shows a sample of this func-
tion graphically where h = 1.
Linear Decay Variation
We also created a variation of the above linear decay function, which decays to h rather
than 0 on the right side. We use a similar to technique to derive the PDF, CDF, and
inverse CDF.
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fb(x,x0,h) =
h 0≤ x < x02x(h−1)
(x0−1)2 +
(h(x20−2x0−1)+2)
(x0−1)2 x0 ≤ x≤ 1
Fb(x,x0,h) =
hx 0≤ x < x0((h−1)x2+(h(x20−2x0−1)+2)x−(h(x20−x0−1)−x0+2)
(x0−1)2 +hx0 x0 ≤ x≤ 1
F−1b (y,x0,h) =

y
h 0≤ y < hx0
|x0−1|
√
4(h−1)y+h2(x20−2x0+1)−4h+4−h(x20−2x0−1)−2)
2(h−1) hx0 ≤ y≤ 1
We use the same input parameter standardization: h = 1/α. Figure 5.1(c) shows a
sample of this variation graphically where h = 1.
Exponential Decay
Rather than linear decay after x0 we can use exponential decay.
pd f (x,x0,h) =
h 0≤ x < x0eb−mx x0 ≤ x≤ 1
1−hx0 =
∫ 1
x0
eb−mxdx
eb =
(1−hx0)m
e−mx0− e−m
Because we want the exponential to have a finite tail, we simplify by considering the
term e−m = 0. Thus:
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b≈ log(m(1−hx0))+amx
fb(x,x0,h) =
h 0≤ x < x0m(1−hx0) · em(x0−x) x0 ≤ x≤ 1
We next need to parameterize this function by selecting an appropriate m given a
value of x0. We choose to limit the error caused by the simplification above. We use ε
to represent the error factor at x = 1
ε = e−m ≈ 0
We parameterize ε by β as follows:
β =−log(ε)
Thus, m for a given β and x0 is
m =
log(1− x0)+β
1− x0
We use a static value of β and use h to vary the biasing level of the function. Next to
convert to a CDF, we integrate
Fb(x,x0h) =
hx 0≤ x < x0hx0+(1− x0)(1− em(x0−x)) x0 ≤ x≤ 1
F−1b (x,x0,h) =

y
h 0≤ y < hx0
x0− 1m log
(
1− y−hx01−hx0
)
hx0 ≤ y < 1
Again we use the standardization h = 1/α . Figure 5.1(d) shows a sample of the expo-
nential decay bias distribution graphically where h = 0.75.
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Reverse Linear
We next evaluate a distribution that attempts to cause fewer splits even when some splits
will occur. The intuition is that sending larger cover sizes even when causing splits,
reduces the total number of splits. To accomplish this, we create another piecewise
function. Unlike the previous functions, this distribution has a flat probability density
to the right of x0. It uses a linear increasing function to the left of x0. The height of
the triangle is a fraction p of the height of the flat line to the right of x0. Using this
technique and parameterization we can create a PDF, CDF, and inverse CDF. First we
can find h using p:
h =
2
px0−2(x0−1)x0
The remainder of the derivation follows as before:
fb(x,x0, p) =

2px
(px0−2(x0−1))x0 0≤ x < x0
h x0 ≤ x≤ 1
Fb(x,x0, p) =

hpx2
2x0
0≤ x < x0
h(px2+2x0x−2x20)
2x0
x0 ≤ x≤ 1
F−1b (y,x0, p) =

√
2x0
hp y 0≤ y < x0 ph2
√
x0
√
2pyh(2p+1)x0√
hp
− x0p x0 ph2 ≤ y≤ 1
Because this function’s parameter is related to the area to the left of x0, we use a dif-
ferent parameter standardization: p = 1− 1/α. Figure 5.1(e) shows a sample of this
function graphically where p = 0.75.
5.1.2 Algorithmic Biasing
The next class bias techniques we investigate work by selecting biased samples using
an algorithm tailored to the traffic property being biased. These functions work directly
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towards our performance goals rather than indirectly through a statistical distribution.
Each algorithm samples the empirical cover distribution several times until it finds a
suitable value. We call this basic approach Try, Try Again (TTA).
Linear TTA
This algorithm works by iteratively sampling the cover distribution up to r times. The
first sample ci, where ci > q, is used to transmit the data. If no suitable c is found after
r samples, the final sample cr is used. Figure 5.2(b) shows a sample output distribution
from this algorithm compared to an unbiased Geometric in Figure 5.2(a).
Optimal TTA
We also developed an enhancement to this algorithm that attempts to find “best fit” c
given the amount data in the pending buffer. Given a set of r random samples c1, . . . ,cr
and q bytes in the pending buffer, the algorithm selects c such that c > q and c is
the minimum of all ci > q. If there is no ci > q, then the algorithm selects c to be
the maximum over all ci. Figure 5.2(c) shows a sample output distribution from this
algorithm.
5.1.3 Sampling Without Replacement
A final consideration for each of the bias functions we have described thus far is the
sampling method. To preserve the shape of the expected cover size distribution to
prevent defense detection attacks, we can sample without replacement. To prevent
exhaustion of the empirical data, we first create a L length subset of samples from
the empirical distribution. We then can run the above algorithms on this subset and
sample without replacement. When exhausted, the algorithm regenerates a new subset
of length L. This ensures that the shape of the observed cover size distribution remains
consistent within a window of L observations.
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of algorithmic biasing of a Geometric distribution (mean 9.77e-
5) with r = 4 and q = 10000 (q shown in red)
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We can sample without replacement with both functional and algorithmic biasing.
We treat the subset Fsub like the original ECDF, Fcov. The functional techniques use
the biased [0,1] value to index into Fsub. Similarly, the algorithmic techniques select r
samples from Fsub before selecting a biased cover size.
5.2 Attacks
We now present the attack and evaluation methodology we use to quantify and compare
the differences between biasing methods. We use simulation to evaluate the attack be-
cause the low-noise of the simulation favors the attacker. We use information theoretic
metrics to compare information leaked by biasing.
5.2.1 Bayesian Attack
We use Bayesian data analysis to form an attack against biasing. The goal of the at-
tacker is to infer the value of q given observation of a single cover session size covi
traversing the network. We present this attack as a theoretical examination of how
much information the attacker can recover when TrafficMimic is biased. We neither
expect this attack perform exceptionally well in practice nor do we provide the de-
sign and evaluation of an attack that can recover the original object size given a set of
inferred q values.
We use Bayes Theorem as follows:
P(q|covi) = p(covi|q)p(q)p(covi) (5.1)
We assume that the attacker knows the distribution of queue and cover session sizes.
We further assume that the attacker has full details of TrafficMimic’s operation and
biasing algorithms (including qmax and the biasing parameter α or r).
In the following sections we describe the three phases of this attack: pre-computation,
observation, and attack.
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1. Pre-computation Before conducting the attack, the attacker needs to compute
the values of p(cov|q) for each possible value of q given a specific biasing algo-
rithm and parameters. With functional biasing, the attacker can compute these
probabilities using the PDF and CDF of the bias distribution. For algorithmic
techniques, the attacker creates a distribution of probabilities by sampling the
output of the bias algorithm to create an empirical distribution of distsize el-
ements. To make these computation scalable, we allow the attacker to bin the
q sizes using the bufincrement variable. We also perform smoothing using a
kernel density estimator [57] on the distributions to create empirical probability
mass functions that can be later used in the Bayes calculations.
2. Observation In the next phase, the attacker observes cover sizes on the network
that he/she wishes to attack. In our attack, we use a simple simulator to generate
data for this phase. The simulator first samples a real session size to transfer
using TrafficMimic. It creates a buffer of size qmax and automatically fills it as
space and real data are available. It then uses the same logic as TrafficMimic
to bias and select cover sizes to cover the real traffic. The simulator runs many
iterations of real flows (qsimi) which each generate one or more cover sizes (covi).
The simulator stores the results in a tuple (qsimi,covi), which is passed to the next
phase. The simulator also computes the average overage (this is perfect overage
with no TrafficMimic overhead, only excess padding bytes sent) and average
number of cover sessions required to send a real object. These values are proxies
for the real performance of the biasing technique when used with TrafficMimic.
3. Attack Application In this phase, the attacker takes an observed cover size from
the simulation, covi, and uses equation 5.1 to generate a probability distribu-
tion of P(q|covi) for all possible qi. The attacker chooses a normalizing factor,
p(covi), for equation 5.1 that ensures that all probabilities sum to one over a suf-
ficiently large sample set. Empirically estimating this value is difficult because
of sampling error. Next the attacker smooths this distribution with a kernel den-
sity estimator and finds the maximum P(qi|cov). We call this maximal likelihood
77
object size qesti . The attacker repeats this process for all covi.
The attacker can then take the qsimi and compare it to qesti to test the accuracy of the
attack. We consider the attack successful if qesti is within the attack bin width (i.e.,
bufincrement) of qsimi .
5.2.2 Mutual Information
In addition to the raw attack accuracy described above, we use several mutual informa-
tion metrics to test the attack. First we define some notation. We use Qsim to denote
a random variable from the distribution observed in qsim. Likewise, we use Qest to de-
note a random variable from the distribution observed in qest . Similarly, we use Csim to
denote a random variable for distribution covi.
To directly evaluate the information recovered using the Bayesian attack, we com-
pute the mutual information of Qsim between Qest :
I(Qsim;Qest) = ∑
qsim∈Qsim
∑
qest∈Qest
p(qsim,qest) log
(
p(qsim,qest)
p(qsim) p(qest)
)
(5.2)
This requires that we compute the joint probability distribution function for Qsim and
Qest . We use the methods described by Ince et al. to compute this mutual informa-
tion [58]. We use the bin width estimator from Silverman [57].
We also develop an estimator for I(Qsim;Qest) using only Csim. Bayes rule provides a
result for Qest by taking the following input: priors of Csim and Qsim and the conditional
probability of Csim given Qsim (i.e., p(covi|q) from equation 5.1). We use M to denote
the random variable from the distribution of p(covi|q). We can then consider Bayes
rules as a function f as follows:
Qest = f (Qsim,M,Csim)
Consider a simplified estimation function g, which takes only Csim as input and pro-
duces an estimate of qg (and its associated random variable Qg):
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Figure 5.3: Mutual information estimator comparison for linearBias with HTTPS traffic
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The prior distribution of Qsim is fixed and does not contribute additional information
to Qest . Furthermore, there is no information in M that is not contained in Csim. Which
leads to the following approximation:
I(Qsim;Qest)≈ I(Qsim;Qg)
The data processing inequality bounds the amount of information in Qg to that in
Csim:
I(Qsim;Qg)≥ I(Qsim;Csim)
Under reasonable conditions3 on g, we find:
I(Qsim;Qest)≈ I(Qsim;Csim)
3In the case that g is a sufficient statistic, then I(Qsim;Qg) = I(Qsim;Csim)
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To test this estimator, we computed both mutual information metrics from simulation
runs collected from each of the bias functions described above. Figure 5.3 shows the
similarity between mutual information computed using I(Qsim;Qest) and I(Qsim;Csim)
for the linearBias function4. We see that the estimator both preserves the shape of the
mutual information metric and is within a small margin of error. For the remainder of
the results in this paper, we use I(Qsim;Csim) because it is faster to compute.
5.3 Simulation Study
We again use network trace data from the CAIDA (for HTTPS and SMTP) and UNC
(for SSH). In all results, we take 20,000 real objects and simulate sending them through
a tunnel of cover traffic with each of the biasing functions. As in Chapter 4, we use
the notation realprotocol / coverprotocol for specifying combinations of real and cover
protocol models. Unless otherwise specified, we use response size distributions.
For comparison to existing constant padding techniques, we also test a biasing func-
tion that always selects a fixed size object (constantMTU). We tested a range of ten
fixed object sizes between the lower and upper quartiles of each real distribution. This
range of fixed object sizes illustrate some of the trade-offs between overhead and num-
ber of sessions for a constant rate scheme.
5.3.1 Performance
We first evaluate biasing HTTPS real traffic from the February CAIDA trace with
HTTPS cover traffic learned from January. We use the algorithms with replacement
described in Section 5.1. Figures 5.4 through 5.7 show the results of this experiment.
Bias parameter 0 in all the series corresponds to unbiased TrafficMimic performance.
As expected, the biasing algorithms are able to reduce the average number of cover
sessions required to send the real object. Since overage in our simulation is only a
reflection of the last cover size required to send each real object, we observed larger
4linearBias is representative of the estimator’s performance for other bias techniques
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Figure 5.4: Session performance of HTTPS/HTTPS biased with replacement
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Figure 5.5: Overhead of HTTPS/HTTPS biased with replacement
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Figure 5.6: Mutual information of HTTPS/HTTPS biased with replacement
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than expected variations across bias techniques. This will be evaluated in more detail
in section 5.5. As Figure 5.5 shows, several algorithms can reduce overage, others (e.g.
linearTTA, expBias, and probSplit) increase overage while still providing good session
performance. This small additional overage is unlikely to affect HTTPS performance
considerably since it will usually add only one additional object transmission time to
the user-perceived latency. Figure 5.6 shows that linear functional techniques leak the
most information about the real object sizes while the algorithmic methods (linear and
optimal TTA) and expBias leak the least information. We observed a small amount
mutual information with no biasing because both distributions drawn from the same
underlying protocol HTTPS.
Since all of these tests are performed with replacement, the biased cover distributions
are skewed from the original expected cover distribution. Figure 5.7 shows a zoomed
view of the empirical CDFs for each biasing algorithm across the entire simulation
for bias parameter 4. We use the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to investigate
the relative differences between the biased cover distributions. All the bias algorithms
have a zero probability of being drawn from the unbiased cover distribution based on
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Figure 5.7: HTTPS/HTTPS observed cover size distribution
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the confidence estimation given by Stephens [59, 60] for bias factors greater than 1.
So, both constantMTU and sampling with replacement provide minimal resistance to
defense detection. We investigate the practicality of using KS as a defense detection
attack in more detail in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.2 Traffic Combinations
We next simulated the SSH protocol over SMTP (See Figures 5.8 through 5.10). In our
previous study, we found that both SMTP and SSH are dissimilarly asymmetric in the
number of bytes sent and received. Because of this, we found more striking differences
between biasing algorithms. The functional algorithms that favored mass above x0,
were able to reduce the number of sessions to nearly 1. However, these algorithms also
resulted in the most overage and considerable information leakage (over 1 bit per cover
object). This is due to SSH needing to send a large response but SMTP only offering
smaller cover sizes. When this distribution is skewed by the bias functions, they push
the SMTP protocol model into a less common but still possible state where its bytes
sent versus received ratio is reversed.
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Figure 5.8: Session performance of SSH/SMTP biased with replacement
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Bias Parameter
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Av
g 
Nu
m
 S
es
si
on
s 
pe
r R
ea
l
constantMTU
expBias
linearBias
linearTTA
optimalTTA
probSplit
reverseLinear
varLinearBias
Figure 5.9: Mutual information of SSH/SMTP biased with replacement
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Figure 5.10: Overhead of SSH/SMTP biased with replacement
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The algorithmic approaches and reverseLinear were less sensitive to this problem.
However, they were only able to provide modest performance advantages. This is
because these algorithms would only occasionally reverse the bytes sent ratio as ev-
idenced by the very small overhead observed in Figure 5.10.
We next looked at sending HTTPS requests over a cover traffic stream of HTTPS
responses. In this case, the unbiased cover distribution would usually be able to transmit
the request in a single session. So, we consider the cover stream over provisioned for
carrying the real stream. Thus, we observed that biasing had only a minimal effect on
the session performance (see Figure 5.11). We also found in Figure 5.12 that several of
the biasing techniques (e.g., optimalTTA, linearBias, reverseLinear, and varLinearBias)
were able to reduce overage even though they are not specifically tuned for this over
provisioned situation.
5.3.3 Defense Detection
We have already established that biasing with replacement provides minimal resistance
to defense detection. We next want to understand how to reduce defense detection risk
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Figure 5.11: Session performance of HTTPS-req/HTTPS-resp biased with replacement
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Figure 5.12: Overhead of HTTPS-req/HTTPS-resp biased with replacement
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Figure 5.13: OptimalTTA without replacement and varying L sized subsets
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while retaining a session and overhead advantage over constantMTU. We approach this
problem by sampling without replacement on a random subset of size L. This allows
the biased cover distribution to remain consistent with the original distribution over a
window of size L. We wish to investigate how varying the size of the sampling subset
L impacts the attacker’s ability to detect biasing using a KS-test.
In our previous examination in Section 5.3.1, we used data from the entire simu-
lation of 20,000 real object transmissions to perform the KS-test. Realistically, the
attacker should choose some smaller window W and test subsets of length W from the
observed cover traffic. This allows the attacker to make a determination about defense
detection much more quickly. The attacker faces a trade-off between noise impacting
detection confidence and the amount of cover traffic needed to make a determination.
Similarly, the defender has a trade-off between performance gain and low detectability.
Intuitively, we expect the attacker to gain the detection advantage when L >W .
We investigated these competing trade-offs using several simulations. We first ex-
amine the session performance of choosing various values for L. We tested the opti-
malTTA algorithm on HTTPS traffic with parameter 5 with a variety of subset sizes.
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Figure 5.14: Windowed KS test attack on optimalTTA
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We show the 99th percentile of session lengths in Figure 5.13. We see performance
improvement over no biasing even with very small values of L (e.g., 5 or 10). We also
tested a much larger subset length of 5000 and found the performance improvement
remained modest at 7.8% fewer sessions than L = 500.
To test the attacker’s trade-off on selecting a W , we use the two-sample KS-test on
the original cover distribution (all the HTTPS response traffic from CAIDA February)
compared to sampled biased cover distributions from Figure 5.13 at a variety of window
and subset lengths. To understand the impact of noise, we also test the original cover
distribution against an independent test set of unbiased data (learned from HTTPS traf-
fic from CAIDA January). We used 95% confidence for the KS test to indicate that the
observed samples are drawn from the same distribution. We repeated testing L length
subsets for 100 iterations for each W . We show the maximum W for which each value
of L falls within the attacker’s confidence interval in Figure 5.14. We also show this
for our independent set of HTTPS traffic (labeled ‘real’ in the chart). We found that
windows above 50 reduced the confidence for the attack against the real test set. Fur-
thermore, we found that the we were able to use values of L smaller than the window
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Figure 5.15: Mutual information of HTTP/HTTP biased without replacement L = 100
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required by the attacker to detect it (deviating from our intuition about detection advan-
tage above). To remain within the noise threshold for an independent test on real traffic,
the attacker needs to use values of W 50 or smaller. So, we can safely use subsets of
length 300 for this particular scenario. We use a conservative estimate of L = 100 for
our remaining examination of sampling strategies.
We next wanted to investigate in more detail the performance properties of all our
biasing techniques when sampled with replacement on a random subset of size 100.
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show the results of this test. As expected, the amount of in-
formation leakage when sampling without replacement was reduced from the what we
observed in Figure 5.6. We see that the KS-statistics for the bias functions are now near
or below the value we observed for bias factor 1 when sampling with replacement. This
results in much higher confidence that the distributions are indistinguishable from real
cover traffic.
Despite remaining consistent with the original cover distribution within the attack
window, sampling without replacement still results in some performance gain. This
is due to cover/real size matches that occur before the subset becomes depleted. Fig-
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Figure 5.16: KS D statistic of HTTP/HTTP biased without replacement L = 100
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ure 5.17 shows the ratio of number of sessions with biasing to the number of sessions
required without biasing. On average there is a 55% increase in the average number
of sessions when sampling without replacement. Unlike sampling with replacement,
average overage for all the biasing techniques was lower than the overage with no bi-
asing. The overage decrease was especially true of bias functions (e.g., expBias and
probSplit) that strongly bias selecting values larger than x0. As the subsets became
more depleted, very large cover sizes were quickly pruned out even though the bias
algorithm was favoring values in the tail of the distribution.
5.3.4 Trading Off Performance and Security
The simulations we have developed can help us to understand the performance and se-
curity trade-offs between techniques. Given the complexities of combining protocols
in tunnels, these simulations themselves can have a great impact on the user’s choice
of cover protocol. To illustrate this by example, we take the HTTPS/HTTPS exper-
iment we performed before and show trade-offs in Figure 5.18. We see that there is
considerable range for improving session performance while maintaining low informa-
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Figure 5.17: Session performance compared to no biasing
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tion leakage (linearTTA, optimalTTA, expBias, and probSplit). However, expBias and
probSplit can have higher overhead than the others. Also consider the example shown
in reverseLinear. It provides good session performance and low overhead, but has one
of the higher information leakages. Since these leaks are still small by comparison, this
might prove appropriate for some user scenarios.
5.4 Biasing Implementation in TrafficMimic
To better understand how these bias functions work on real networks and with a full
cover traffic model (which includes timing, exchanges, and connections rather than uni-
directional biased object sizes), we implemented algorithmic and functional biasing in
our full C++ implementation described in Section 2.3. To enable biasing, we needed
to change portions of the core traffic generation architecture. We also added a critical
performance enhancement that we discovered during the development of our SSFNet
simulator. We re-factored TrafficMimic to deliver real data as soon as it arrived rather
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Figure 5.18: Performance and security trade-offs for HTTPS/HTTPS biasing
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(b) Mutual information versus overage
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than waiting for the entire cover traffic message that carries it to finish. This allows
heavily padded messages to be delivered quickly and the destination to begin process-
ing while the remainder of the padding finishes.
The primary change required for implementing biasing is that the biasing algorithms
need the current state of the real traffic in order to select an optimal cover traffic param-
eter. We developed two solutions to this problem: feedback and split biasing.
5.4.1 Feedback
Since the master controls all cover traffic in a bidirectional cover traffic tunnel, this
meant that we need a feedback mechanism to pass the current buffer state from the
slave back through the tunnel to the master. Furthermore, the main event loop, where
the state of the real connection is stored and serviced, runs in a separate thread from
the master model thread. So, even the local real buffer state is not directly accessible to
the master model thread (where biased parameters are selected). TrafficMimic already
sends confirmation traffic reqs back across the tunnel when responding to the master.
The primary purpose of these confirmations is to synchronize the generation of traffic
using IDs. We overloaded some unused fields in these confirmations to store the real
buffer state. Upon receiving the confirmation, the master’s event loop also embeds the
local state into the confirmation. It then enqueues the confirmation to the master model
thread. So, after sending some data that required a response, the master model thread
will have an updated view of both the local and remote buffer states.
5.4.2 Split Biasing
We observed that when using algorithmic biasing, we could split the biasing process
into two phases: one phase executed by the master model thread and one phase executed
by the event loop. This allowed us to avoid having stale information about the local or
remote buffer state because we can offload the selection of the optimal traffic parameter
to the event loops of both the master and slave. Though this effect is minimal when
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applied to the local buffer state on the master, the potential for stale buffer information
on the slave could be considerable. To split the biasing process we allow the master
model thread to select r random variates from the appropriate distribution and encode
them into a special type of traffic req called a traffic req multi. Because small rs tend to
produce considerable performance improvements (as we observed during simulation),
the additional overhead is minimal. Unfortunately, this splitting can only be used with
the TTA algorithms because they only need to send a small amount of data. Functional
biasing methods would require transmission of large empirical distributions (thousands
of observations) to offload biasing to the slave while still maintaining control of the
biasing and model training processes at the master.
5.5 Real-World System Evaluation
Using our bias-enabled implementation of TrafficMimic we repeated some of the per-
formance tests from Chapter 3. We used the MN-UK link for the tests. We trained
Swing using the February CAIDA traces for HTTPS and SMTP and the 2003 UNC
traces for SSH. We used each of the bias algorithms with replacement. Unless other-
wise specified we used the feedback biasing implementation.
5.5.1 Bulk Transfer
We first repeated the 100KB bulk transfer using each of the biasing algorithms with a
range of bias parameters. Figure 5.19 shows the results for transferring 100KB over
the HTTPS response stream biased with each of the algorithms with replacement. We
observed considerable increases in bandwidth, especially for functional biasing tech-
niques. Bulk transferring 100KB (i.e., greater than qmax), ensures that x0 remains nearly
1 for much of the test. This allows the functional algorithms to heavily utilize the long
tails of the cover object size distributions. Since the algorithmic techniques have a rel-
atively smaller working set of values from which to choose (i.e., maximum 10), their
performance gain is more modest.
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Figure 5.19: Bulk transfer over HTTPS-resp
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We also show how biasing with optimalTTA improves the performance for different
cover protocols in Figure 5.20. We perform a 100KB bulk transfer over the request
stream of each protocol. We choose optimalTTA for its solid performance and low
information leakage in a variety of scenarios as observed during simulation.
We saw reductions in bidirectional overhead for SSH and HTTPS-req. Since the
SMTP request stream is larger than SSH and SMTP, there is minimal overhead due
mostly to the need for an empty response stream. We observed a 3.5 to 5.5x improve-
ment in bandwidth with biasing across all the algorithms. Unfortunately, biasing cannot
improve the performance of SSH, without vastly changing its attacker observed output
distribution thereby failing defense detection and leaking too much information. The
optimalTTA algorithm prevents this problem at the expense of better performance.
5.5.2 Web Browsing
We next repeated the Web site load time experiment from Section 3.3.3. We show the
results of biasing load times with the optimalTTA algorithm with parameter 5 in Fig-
ure 5.21. We show the speedup from using biasing compared to the unbiased data in
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Figure 5.20: Bulk transfer with the optimalTTA algorithm
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Table 5.1: Web browsing with biased cover traffic (seconds)
HTTPS-Split HTTPS SMTP SSH
google.com 6.45 6.42 72.53 14.77
facebook.com 8.82 11.65 42.44 11.47
youtube.com 14.62 15.18 126.10 36.64
yahoo.com 19.43 34.19 151.77 28.58
live.com 12.05 12.70 77.12 22.12
Figure 5.21: Website load time speedup with optimalTTA, parameter 5
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Figure 3.6. We show the raw values in Table 5.1. We found a 2.5-9.5x improvement
in Website load time with biasing. We were also able to considerably improve the per-
formance of Web browsing over the SMTP protocol (see Figure 5.22). Unfortunately,
using this protocol for tunneling HTTP still falls short of practicality for most users.
There are some fundamental incompatibilities in the interaction of these protocols. We
found the most considerable problems with SMTP were related to long inter-exchange
times and a relatively small response stream.
Lastly, we wanted to investigate the effect of feedback versus split biasing on perfor-
mance. The Website test is most indicative of a real user because it includes both di-
rections and some timing discrepancies. Thus, we are most likely to observe problems
associated with stale buffer information in this test. We show the results of browsing to
the top 5 websites with split biasing using HTTPS in Figure 5.21. We found that split
biasing usually provided a small performance improvement over feedback. However,
the degradation caused by feedback does not outweigh using functional biasing when
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Figure 5.22: Web browsing over SMTP
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it is more appropriate than algorithmic techniques.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed functional and algorithmic methods to bias the selec-
tion of cover traffic parameters based on the needs of the real traffic. Since we found
splitting to have a significant impact on performance in Chapter 4, we performed an
evaluation using object size distributions and biasing techniques that avoid splitting
while minimizing overhead. We found that our biasing strategy was able to improve
performance while bounding information leakage and retaining resistance to defense
detection. Furthermore, the biasing techniques we have developed are general enough
to be applied to other performance sensitive traffic parameters like packet or session
timing.
We then performed a system evaluation of biasing in TrafficMimic using real Inter-
net links. We confirmed the performance gains with biasing are considerable with real
and synthetic workloads. Though cover traffic tunneling will always exact some per-
formance cost, our work has shown that TrafficMimic can be used practically on the
Internet. This helps to ensure that its integration into other privacy enhancing technolo-
gies like VPNs or anonymity systems is feasible for real users.
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CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we present related work in the research areas that this work spans. We
also expand upon the related work on traffic analysis threats from Section 1.2.
6.1 Traffic Analysis
The traffic analysis attacks we described in Section 1.2 focus on attacking specific
protocols usually at the connection level between two fixed hosts. There has also been
prior work in analyzing cross-host connection behaviors. Karagiannis et al. developed
a classification strategy called BLINC that uses host connection patterns, server/client
traffic disparities, and community detection to perform flow classification [61]. They
focus on peer-to-peer traffic, but find that their approach has value for detecting and
understanding a wide variety of protocols. They also develop heuristics for detecting
attacks and other types of anomalous behavior using traffic analysis.
Later work extended some of the concepts from BLINC to create traffic dispersion
graphs (TDGs). These graphs model the social behavior of the network using a directed
graph where edges are defined with some network interaction [62]. They construct
TDGs using both cross-host connection behavior and single connection features (e.g.,
bytes sent/received). Iliofotou et al. go on to create dynamically updating TDGs and
use them to detect polymorphic blending attacks [63]. They find that they are able to
correctly classify peer-to-peer traffic attempting to blend with a set of standard proto-
cols (e.g., HTTP, DNS, etc...) even when the amount of blended peer-to-peer traffic is
only 10% of the standard traffic. TrafficMimic would be able to evade single connec-
tion statistics used by a TDG-based detector but does not obscure cross-host connection
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patterns without being used with a VPN or proxy.
Traffic analysis is an effective defensive tool for detecting the command and control
signals from botnets. Botsniffer [64] used traffic analysis techniques to detect bonet
command control, which relied on cross-host connection counting similar to the work
on BLINC. Gu et al. later developed BotMiner, which more fully took advantage of
traffic analysis for command and control detection [65]. BotMiner’s c-plane monitor
collected netflow records on which hosts were communicating and used non-parametric
clustering to find groups of hosts with similar communication patterns. By correlating
this information with data on botnet activities (e.g., sending SPAM, scanning, etc...),
they were able to improve botnet detection accuracy. They also address some potential
evasion techniques that botnets can use to evade their detection techniques including
real traffic mimicry and covert channels.
Zeng et al. expand on the work of BotMiner [66] to correlate network traffic analysis
with host-based data collection. This allows greater flexibility for deployment because
it alleviates the privacy issues associated with deep packet inspection, and it provides
higher quality data to the detector because anonymous network traffic analysis can be
error-prone [67].
Traffic analysis and intrusion detection experimentation often requires real labeled
network training data. Several efforts have attempted to provide better labeling. Tres-
tian et al. develop heuristics to classify end host application usage in a target network
by searching for freely available or unintentionally leaked information from logs, fo-
rums, lists, and peer-to-peer tracking [68]. This technique is especially powerful when
little to no network trace data is available. Gringoli et al. developed the gt architecture
for collecting host-level information to establish the ground truth about the protocol
and even application origins of network packet data. In future work, we could use
gt to collect application information to better label the training data we used with our
classification attack in Section 3.1.
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6.2 Preventing Traffic Analysis
One commonly studied method for preventing traffic analysis is to add packets to the
stream to remove the correlation between the plaintext protocol and its encrypted equiv-
alent. Guan et al. developed NetCamo, which provides traffic analysis resistance by
adding and rerouting packets with strict quality of service bounds [69]. In later work,
they investigated how constant and variable packet inter-arrival times resist traffic anal-
ysis [70]. Wang et al. propose methods to optimally schedule real and padding packets
in low-latency anonymity systems to prevent flow linking attacks [71]. Levine et al. in-
vestigated timing information leaked by low-latency mix systems [14]. They propose a
novel traffic analysis prevention technique called defensive dropping to be used in con-
cert with constant-rate padding. Since any legitimate packet drops in a constant-rate
stream of packets will increase its correlation through a mix, they propose injecting
such drop events randomly into the stream.
Another defense mechanism is to pad data at the application rather than packet layer.
Liberatore and Levine evaluate several methods for determining the identities of pages
in an encrypted Web browsing session [6]. To defend against their attack, they propose
several effective, yet high overhead, application layer link padding methods. Other
systems use cover traffic mixed with peer traffic and padding (e.g., Tarzan [72]) or
plaintext blending (e.g., Infranet [73]) to evade traffic analysis.
Similar to our work, Wright et al. propose mapping real traffic patterns onto an ex-
isting real cover traffic model [74]. They use a linear optimization to find a solution
to map packet sizes from the real traffic to the target packet size distribution. They
evaluate their technique with success against an HTTP Web site identification attack as
well as VoIP phrase detection. Differing from our work, their work focuses solely on
packet sizes, rather than timings, and assumes that the former are either independently
and identically distributed or from short packet sequences. They do not address the
degree to which their technique prevents defense detection, especially when looking at
longer packet sequences. Gianvecchio et al. developed a covert timing channel based
on learning a distribution of inter-packet delays from specified input traffic [75]. They
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likewise assume that inter-packet delays are i.i.d. Our work produces greater realism
since it mimics protocol features that are more than one or two packets long.
6.3 Traffic Modeling and Generation
Traffic generation has been the subject of study in the simulation, modeling, and per-
formance assessment fields for some time. Being a dominant protocol on the Internet
for some time, previous work has focused heavily on modeling HTTP traffic. Mah per-
formed one of the first measurement studies of empirical Web packet trace data [76].
He found that most features did not have a good enough fit to a known distribution, so
he used inverse transform sampling of empirical distributions to model traffic (as we
do for TrafficMimic).
Barford and Crovella also developed a model for HTTP traffic called SURGE [39].
Differing from the work of Mah, SURGE uses several structural components and fits
the empirical data to known parametrized distributions. Harpoon later automated this
process for generic protocols using a network trace to configure the generator [40]. It
collects empirical statistics from an input trace on file sizes, interconnection times, IP
addresses, and the number of active sessions and then uses this empirical data to play
back UDP transfers.
Cao et al. developed a connection-based model of HTTP traffic [77]. They argue
that the connection/network model better captures the behavior of HTTP on the net-
work than the page-oriented models often used to test Web server performance. In a
similar vein, Swing [15] generates realistic network traffic for use in an emulation en-
vironment using generic network traffic models. It uses empirical distributions taken
from a network trace of users, applications, connections, and the network to generate
realistic TCP traffic.
Kannan et al. focus on modeling and reconstructing user sessions which span differ-
ent connections and even protocols [78]. They represent user sessions using determin-
istic finite automata, which capture the order, type, and directionality of the connections
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composing a session. In future work, TrafficMimic could incorporate cross connection
session features in the generation of cover traffic.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Of the myriad challenges to communicating securely over a network, preventing traffic
analysis is perhaps the most daunting. Seemingly insignificant information leakage can
compromise the security of encryption, key management, and secure protocol design.
The growing use of encryption is forcing traffic analysis into the mainstream of privacy
attacks, while effective and practical defenses have seen only minimal deployment.
Through our work on this dissertation, we have begun to address this shortcoming. We
have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of a realistic cover traffic
tunneling system called TrafficMimic, which strongly resists traffic analysis and de-
fense detection.
Through our use of realistic cover traffic, TrafficMimic addresses both traditional
traffic analysis as well as defense detection attacks. We have shown that traffic classifi-
cation, anomaly detection, and defense detection attacks are all unable to differentiate
real traffic from our synthetic cover traffic. Through our use of independent traffic
models or mutual information bounded biasing, we ensure that minimal information
about the real traffic is leaked to the attacker. Because we based the attacks on state-
of-the-art techniques (including clustering, K-NN classification, Bayesian inference,
KS-testing), allowed the attacker considerable resources and access (including large
varied training sets where we assume port-based labeling is correct), and ensured that
the attacks were practical for use on real networks (by validating our techniques using
independent validation sets collected at different times and on different networks), we
have high confidence that our defenses work. While these attacks do not represent the
full spectrum of potential attacks against TrafficMimic, they are sufficiently powerful
and varied to illustrate the robustness of TrafficMimic.
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Since our aim is to address traffic analysis attacks in real systems, we devoted consid-
erable effort to the practicality of the implementation and performance of TrafficMimic.
We found independent cover traffic modeling was very secure but suffered poor perfor-
mance especially for common Internet tasks (e.g., chat or Web browsing). After careful
study of independent cover traffic tunneling with simulation and a bi-directional ana-
lytic model, we addressed the performance gap by developing cover traffic parameter
biasing methods, which tune the cover tunnel to the requirements of the real traffic.
Since this technique has the potential to leak information, we developed attacks and
methods to understand the information leakage and the affects biasing have on defense
detection. By using these performance enhancements, we were found a multiple fold
increase in the performance of TrafficMimic tunneling.
These performance improvements provide users with a variety of choices of cover
traffic models with differing properties for information leakage, defense detection re-
sistance, bandwidth, and latency. Since standard encrypted protocols provide minimal
resistance to traffic analysis, these choices widen the spectrum of options for a privacy
seeking user. Through our work, we have created a range of traffic analysis defenses
that allow users to balance performance with better security.
7.1 Future Work
There are several areas of future research that will improve the fidelity, performance,
and security of TrafficMimic. First, we expect that learning models of traffic for secure
traffic generation can be improved. For example, we can encapsulate more network
traffic details like multi-connection or multi-port sessions. We can also capture addi-
tional security-sensitive details like careful mimicry of the plaintext portions of the SSL
handshake and connection setup.
Second, we can further improve performance by biasing other cover traffic parame-
ters. As discussed in Chapter 5, our biasing techniques are general enough to be applied
to other parameters like inter-connection time, number of exchanges, etc.. These en-
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hancements can provide better interactive latency for real-time sessions or chat. This
would further expand the security and performance options offered by realistic cover
traffic generation.
The third opportunity for future work is tighter integration of TrafficMimic into com-
mon privacy enhancing technologies. We have already shown how TrafficMimic can
integrate in several ways to the Tor anonymity network. To help the adoption of Traf-
ficMimic within Tor, we intend to perform a Tor-specific performance and security
evaluation. Since Tor is capacity limited, we may need to tune our bias algorithms to
minimize excess padding while still providing the SSL traffic analysis resistance that
Tor currently lacks.
We also intend to investigate how TrafficMimic can implement a VPN, which tunnels
all of a user’s traffic through multiple cover traffic streams. We have already performed
some analysis that suggests that packet-oriented tunneling has certain performance ad-
vantages. We will investigate this further both through additional simulation study and
evaluating a real TrafficMimic VPN implementation.
Lastly, we also plan to investigate how TrafficMimic functionality can be encapsu-
lated into a library for inclusion with arbitrary programs. We could implement this
feature using a library wrapper around the SSL library similar to the way transparent
socks proxies wrap the socket interface. This would broaden the adoption of Traf-
ficMimic by allowing developers and users alike to seamlessly integrate traffic analysis
into any application that already uses SSL encryption for its network communications.
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